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Abstract 
This thesis investigates the so‐called “single‐vendor” commercial open source business 
model, as exemplified by SugarCRM. Within the conceptual framework of Actor‐Network 
Theory, the case study is informed by three interrelated research questions. The first relates 
to the different stakeholders and their incentives for participation. The second concerns the 
strategies applied by the owning entity to meet these stakeholders’ expectations and needs, 
whilst at the same time safeguarding its own shareholders’ interests. Following, the last 
takes on friction points that could undermine the viability of SugarCRM’s business model, 
and corresponding strategies by the firm to avoid them.  
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1 Introduction 
The last decade has witnessed overwhelming adoption‐ and adaption rates of open source 
software (OSS1). From being a hacker’s exclusive domain of endeavor, it has rapidly evolved 
into a wider ecosystem of aligning interests. Accordingly, OSS has been heralded as a “game 
changing” force – a constituent of the contemporary socio‐technological Zeitgeist. The 
recent developments, coupled with the catalyzing mediatory role of the Internet, have 
raised a multitude of questions among scholars and business leaders alike. How, for 
instance, can market players effectively utilize OSS as a strategic asset? And what are the 
implications for the competitive landscape?  
1.1  Background and motivation 
The players of the software industry have approached OSS from a variety of angles. Some 
outright attacked it, as if it were a cancer to their intellectual property rights. Others 
wholeheartedly embraced it in an attempt to harness its powers. Software companies are 
said to draw a range of benefits by adapting an open source business model, such as:  
• Reduced costs for development, support and marketing 
• Efficient quality control 
• Demand‐driven innovation and –adaptation 
• Short time to market.  
These benefits build on two intrinsic features of OSS projects: A pool of voluntary co‐
developers and testers (community), and a distinctly lean development model2. Thus, to get 
it right, open source software projects need to fulfill at least two essential preconditions:  
1. Attracting a sizable and healthy community 
2. Employing the community effectively 
In a commercial context, meeting these requirements is no trivial task. Pure OSS projects are 
driven by community members’ need and enjoyment of developing and using a given 
                                                     
1 With OSS, I refer not only to the software itself, but also related development methodologies and licensing 
schemes. See Chapter 2.3 for definition of OSS.  
2 The “Cathedral” model, coined by Eric S. Raymond (1997). See chapter 2.3.5 and Appendix B. 
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software3. Commercial variants (COSS), on the other hand, must also adhere to the interests 
of shareholders4. This necessitates one further precondition:  
3. Balancing the interests of commercial stakeholders and the open source community. 
In other words, conventional OSS projects’ raison d'être is to satisfy the wants of their 
community, while COSS project’s ultimate goal is to increase shareholders’ value. The 
challenge is to reconcile these deviating interests into long‐lasting symbiotic relationships. 
Against this backdrop, my thesis investigates the commercial application of OSS, with a main 
focus on the incentives, character and interplay of involved stakeholders. My interest in this 
subject was initially triggered by the extensive use of a COSS application (SugarCRM, 
Community Edition) by my former employer.  The quality and rapidly growing market share 
of this product compelled me to take a closer look, considering the prospect that it could 
inspire entrepreneurial emulation of the underlying business model. 
It is worth noting that this problem domain probably expands beyond the boundaries of the 
software industry. Mimicking the success of OSS, we have lately witnessed the open source 
model being applied to everything from computer hardware and architecture, to cars, 
medical devices and design. Even though I have no ambitions to extrapolate my findings to 
other industries, I suggest they should be considered to be of relevance to all commercial 
open source adaptations. 
  
                                                     
3 The motivations for participation in OSS communities are fully discussed in chapter 2.3.1.  
4 Which also implicates the interests of paying customers.  
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1.2  Problem definition and structure of the thesis 
The objective of this thesis is to explore and analyze the viability of the “commercial open 
source” business model, as exemplified by my object of inquiry – SugarCRM5. Strictly 
defined, this case study aims to shed light on the following set of research questions: 
1. Stakeholder motivation: Who are the involved parties in the software development 
process, and what are their primary incentives for participation? 
 
2. Strategies: Which strategies do the commercial entity employ to satisfy the 
stakeholders’ expectations and needs, whilst at the same time safeguarding 
shareholder interests? 
 
3. Friction points: Following from the previous – are there notable friction points 
between involved stakeholders, which could undermine the viability of SugarCRM’s 
business model? If yes, how does the firm handle them? 
In my pursuit for relevant answers, I take on an exploratory grounded theory approach (see 
Chapter 3). This methodological approach is well reflected in the successively narrowing 
focus of the thesis’ narrative – from general theoretical foundations of open source and its 
commercial incarnation (Chapter 2), to an analysis of SugarCRM’s distinguishing 
particularities (Chapter 4). For readers unfamiliar with the concepts of open source, I also 
include a literature review of perhaps the most defining writing on the phenomenon (see 
Appendix B).  
 
  
                                                     
5 SugarCRM is both the name of the company, and its software solution (prominently labeled as “commercial 
open source CRM”).  
4 
  
5 
2 Theoretical Foundations 
In this chapter, I introduce and discuss the concepts that provide the theoretical foundations 
for the later analysis. It opens with a prologue to set a historical scene (2.1), followed by an 
introduction of essential Actor‐Network Theory (ANT) terminology to prepare for its 
subsequent use (2.2). This lays the ground for a closer study of the multifaceted 
phenomenon of open source software (2.3), including a systematic dissection along its socio‐
technological, organizational and legal dimensions. After a brief look at generic open source 
business models (2.3.7), we are then in the position to turn our attention to the specific 
variant that is relevant to the object of inquiry (2.4).  
2.1 Prologue: The renaissance of open source software 
“In the beginning, there were Real Programmers” 
This is how Eric S. Raymond (1999a) boldly kicks off his historical account of software 
“hackerdom”. With “Real Programmers”, he refers to members of the “self‐conscious 
technical culture of enthusiast programmers, people who built and played with software for 
fun” (ibid.). These were scientists or amateur‐radio hobbyists from the early days of 
computing who shared their ideas openly through various communities. Thus, open 
revealing and distribution of code began as the default modus operandi of software 
development, albeit without any defined naming label or alternative. But with the rise of 
proprietary software in the late 70s and early 80s (e.g. AT&T’s UNIX, Microsoft DOS and 
Windows) the hacker movement came under increasing pressure. Software manufacturers 
stopped distributing their source code and restrictive licenses prohibited copying and 
redistribution. These developments prompted an aggravated Harvard graduate and MIT6 
employee, Richard Stallman, to announce the following in 19837: 
  
 
                                                     
6 MIT Artificial Intelligence Laboratory  
7 This is the extended version of the original announcement, as incorporated into The GNU Manifesto. 
Retrieved October 8, 2012 from http://www.gnu.org/gnu/manifesto.html. Note: GNU was to be a free (as in 
liberty) replacement of the proprietary Unix operating system. The name stands for “Gnu’s not Unix”. 
6 
I consider that the Golden Rule requires that if I like a program I must share it with other people 
who like it. Software sellers want to divide the users and conquer them, making each user agree 
not to share with others. I refuse to break solidarity with other users in this way. I cannot in good 
conscience sign a nondisclosure agreement or a software license agreement. For years I worked 
within the Artificial Intelligence Lab to resist such tendencies and other inhospitalities, but 
eventually they had gone too far: I could not remain in an institution where such things are done 
for me against my will.  So that I can continue to use computers without dishonor, I have decided 
to put together a sufficient body of free software so that I will be able to get along without any 
software that is not free. I have resigned from the AI Lab to deny MIT any legal excuse to prevent 
me from giving GNU away. 
The GNU project heralded the start of the free software movement, and in 1985 Stallman 
established the Free Software Foundation (FSF). Ever since, the FSF has been a fervent 
promoter of free software, which concedes its users the rights (or “freedoms”) to “run, copy, 
distribute, study, change and improve the software”8. To that end, the FSF devised novel 
licensing schemes (see chapter 2.3.6) and continued to push the GNU project onwards.  
In 1997, Eric Raymond published his famous inquiry into an emerging open software 
engineering methodology, based on lessons drawn from the development of Linux9 and his 
own fetchmail project (see chapter 2.5.3 and Appendix B). He likened the conventional 
software development process to that of a cathedral (monolithic, slow, top‐down) and 
contrasted it to the model of a bazaar (open, distributed, agile and bottom‐up). By pointing 
out the shortcomings of the Cathedral model, and confronting them with exemplified 
benefits of the Bazaar model, he conveyed a convincing case for others to adopt the latter10. 
However, the model is inherently linked with open revealing of source code, a concept 
associated with an obscure hacker culture that antagonized commercial interests. Raymond 
and others therefore deemed the ideological underpinnings and confrontational attitude of 
the FSF as detrimental (Perens, 1999). As Raymond put it in an interview with the Salon 
magazine11: 
                                                     
8 From The Free Software Definition (FSD), http://www.gnu.org/philosophy/free‐sw.html 
9 Licensed under the GPLv2 (GNU General Public License, version 2), which was authored by the FSF. 
10 Raymond has been widely credited (e.g. Charles, 1999) as a major inspiration for the alteration of Netscape 
Navigator into the open sourced breed of Mozilla Firefox. 
11 Leonard, A. (1998‐03‐30), Let my software go! Interview with Eric Raymond. Retrieved October 8, 2012 from 
http://www.salon.com/1998/03/30/feature947788266/ 
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The name “free software” has to go. The problem is nobody knows what “free” means, and to 
the extent that they do think they know, it’s tied in with a whole bunch of ideology and that 
crazy guy from Boston, Richard Stallman. […] I love Richard dearly [..], but in the battle we are 
fighting now, ideology is just a handicap. We need to be making arguments based on economics 
and development processes and expected return. We do not need to behave like Communards 
pumping our fists on the barricades. This is a losing strategy. So [..] we needed a new label, and 
we brainstormed a bunch of them and the one that we finally came up with is “open source.” 
The open source movement was born, and, in early 1998, Raymond and Bruce Perens 
established the Open Source Initiative (OSI). In spite of their differences, both camps 
promote many of the same licensing schemes. But while the FSF still maintains that software 
should be “free” on ethical grounds, the OSI represents a more pragmatic view that sees 
open source as a means to an end12: 
Open source is a development method for software that harnesses the power of distributed peer 
review and transparency of process. The promise of open source is better quality, higher 
reliability, more flexibility, lower cost, and an end to predatory vendor lock-in.  
Since the turn of the millennium, OSS has gradually evolved into a mainstream phenomenon 
and altered the basic nature of the software industry (Fitzgerald, 2006). As it grew in 
popularity, it also attracted increasing amounts of attention and opposition from closed 
source incumbents. In 2001 Microsoft’s CEO, in an attempt to discredit the movement, 
attacked the company’s major OSS rival (Linux), describing it as “cancer that attaches itself in 
an intellectual property sense to everything it touches”13. Meanwhile, new enterprises have 
thrived within the new OSS paradigm (e.g. Red Hat), and many established behemoths have 
endorsed, supported and / or utilized it for own benefit (e.g. Novell, IBM and Sun). When 
IBM’s Watson won the 2011 TV game show Jeopardy, it was much thanks to Linux on which 
it ran. Apparently, IBM treats OSS know‐how as a strategic asset (Capek et.al, 2005). Already 
in 1999, it established the IBM Linux Technology Center, which cooperates with the open 
source community and “serves as a center of technical competency for Linux”14. In the same 
spirit, it started several OSS initiatives by itself and adopted OSS licensing schemes for 
                                                     
12 From the OSI’s mission statement, Retrieved October 8, 2012 from http://opensource.org/ 
13 In Microsoft CEO takes launch break with the Sun-Times, Chicago Sun‐Times, June 1, 2001; archived from the 
original on December 11, 2001; retrieved November 6, 2011 from 
http://web.archive.org/web/20011211130654/http://www.suntimes.com/output/tech/cst‐fin‐micro01.html   
14 Retrieved November 14, 2011 from the LTC web page, http://www‐03.ibm.com/linux/ltc/  
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existing software. In 2005, IBM also made a significant “non‐assertion” pledge to let OSS 
developers use 500 of its patents without fear of infringement15. Even Microsoft seems to 
have softened its stance lately. In 2006 it launched CodePlex, an open source project site16, 
and soon got two of its own licenses approved by the OSI17. Such Microsoft‐led initiatives 
have lit the blogosphere ablaze with speculation. Some construe them as a tactical smoke 
screen, others as a sincere strategic realignment – “If you can't beat them, join them”, so the 
logic goes. Whatever the underlying rationale, it underscores the focal role that OSS has 
gained in the software industry: You have to relate to it somehow. 
  
                                                     
15 “IBM Statement of Non-Assertion of Named Patents Against OSS”, retrieved November 14, 2011 from 
http://www.ibm.com/ibm/licensing/patents/pledgedpatents.pdf  
16 Which mainly hosts OSS projects relating to Microsoft technologies (e.g. .NET framework).  
17 Namely the Microsoft Public License (Ms‐PL) and Microsoft Reciprocal License (Ms‐RL). 
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2.2 Actor-Network Theory terminology 
For the analysis and description of socio‐technical ensembles, I (as others, e.g. Tuomi, 2001; 
Tatnall 2003) find it valuable to borrow key assumptions and terminology from Actor‐
Network Theory (ANT). I have no ambitions to provide a full introduction to ANT here, but 
rather explain its relevant concepts and how they are applied throughout this thesis 
(rephrasing Berdal 2004). 
Two ANT concepts are of particular relevance to describe and analyze characteristics of the 
open source development process and governance models: inscription (Akrich 1992; Akrich 
and Latour 1992) and translation (Callon 1991; Latour 1987). Inscription refers to the way 
technical artefacts embody patterns of use: “Technical objects thus simultaneously embody 
and measure a set of relations between heterogeneous elements” (Akrich 1992: 205, in 
Hanseth and Monteiro 1998). As Hanseth and Moneiro further explain: 
The term inscription might sound somewhat deterministic by suggesting that action is 
inscribed, grafted or hard wired into an artefact. This, however, is a misinterpretation. 
Balancing the tight rope between, on the one hand, an objectivistic stance where artefacts 
determine the use and, on the other hand, a subjectivistic stance holding that an artefact is 
always interpreted and appropriated flexibly, the notion of inscription may be used to 
describe how concrete anticipations and restrictions of future patterns of use are involved in 
the development and use of technology. 
Translation is the process of continuous negotiations within a network of inter‐related actors 
(that is, an actor‐network), where aligning interests result in manifestations of “...ordering 
effects such as devices, agents, institutions, or oraganizations” (Law 1992: 366, in Hanseth 
and Monteiro 1998). The input of the translation (such as anticipations or interests) is 
thereby converted into another state, for which the resulting inscribed entity (which may be 
anything from a work practice or software to legal framework) is to serve as its agent. The 
inscription includes programs of action for the end‐users, by defining roles to be played by 
both users and the inscribed entity. The success of the translation depends on the strength 
of the inscription, or sum of inscriptions, and the resistance, or anti‐programs, towards the 
inscribed patterns of use. A classic example is that of a hotel manager who attaches weights 
to keys to persuade guests to leave their keys at the reception desk on leaving (Latour 1991). 
Thereby, the inscribing actor is making “assumptions about what competencies are required 
by the users as well as the system (Latour 1991). In ANT terminology, she [the actor] 
10 
delegates roles and competencies to the components of the socio‐technical network, 
including users as well as the components of the system. By inscribing programs of action 
into a piece of technology, the technology becomes an actor [or actant18], imposing its 
inscribed program of action on its users” (Hanseth and Monteiro 1998). 
In the case of this thesis’ problem domain, the concepts of inscription and translation are 
highly relevant to understand and depict the characteristics that influence the modus 
operandi of open source innovation and stakeholder interaction. It is, in this context, 
important to understand the complexity found in most actor‐networks, such as open source 
projects. The number of involved actants is immense, and the different cause‐effect 
relations can be based on everything from rational intentions, aligning power‐structures and 
compromises, to random accidents and human emotions. Thus, the programs of use within a 
given OSS project may draw their roots from many dispersed actants, of which only some 
are readily available or even traceable. As Monteiro (1999, p.244) writes: 
To make sense of such a complex context, it is absolutely essential to simplify, that is, collapse 
complexity by zooming out, by treating comprehensive actor-networks as simple actants. 
Hence, we talk about the interests of whole organizations, governmental agencies etc. even 
though it is clear that this is but a short-hand. 
Accordingly, I find it useful to talk about the project maintainer*19 of an OSS project as a 
single entity, while it in fact may be constituted by a number of people, who follow 
directives and use technical enhancers to employ their will. The level of “zooming out” is 
naturally given by the extent of information I have at hand, and the amount of complexity 
that seems reasonable to handle. 
  
                                                     
18 As the actors in a given network can be both human and non–human, actant is used as a general term. 
19 Terms assigned with an asterisk (*) are explained in Appendix A. 
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2.3  Open Source Software 
Although the term “open source” originates from the software domain, it has since gained a 
much more generic meaning and appliance. One may sensibly ask, then, what is “open 
source”? A development methodology? A culture or movement? A legal framework? All 
these definientia seem plausible, yet none is sufficient in its own right. In this chapter I 
convey my understanding of this multifaceted term and clarify its use for the remainder of 
this thesis. 
In one sense, “open source” is ostensibly self‐explanatory – it refers to source that is open. 
But, as the reader by no means is required to be a computer scientist, a short clarification is 
warranted. Proprietary software is typically distributed as binary code. That is, code which 
the operating system can run, but is incomprehensible to human eyes (hence, often denoted 
as “closed code”). An analogy is a newly purchased car, along which the buyer receives some 
rudimentary documentation. If the owner wanted to make extensive adjustments to the 
vehicle, the provided documentation is unlikely to suffice. For that, one would need the car’s 
blueprints. Correspondingly, to alter software effectively, one needs access to its source 
code20. In the most rudimentary sense of the term “open source” thus refers to readily 
available access of blueprints21 of any type of artefact.  
A wide body of literature implies at least three dimensions to OSS (e.g. Raymond, 1997; 
Lerner and Tirole, 2001; Bonaccorsi and Rossi, 2003; Lakhani and von Hippel, 2003; Lakhani 
and Wolf, 2005; Henkel, 2006): 
1. Socio‐technological foundation: A shared code repository, along with a set of evolved 
best practices and compatible norms, serves as the basis for collaboration. The 
Internet enables effective communication and coordination, while readily available 
software tools boost the development process. A wide range of motivational factors 
attract members to OSS communities and encourage participation. 
                                                     
20 Which is in a human‐understandable programming language, and (unless in an interpreted programming  
   language, such as PHP or JavaScript) needs to be compiled in order to be executed. 
21 In most fields where the term “open source” is applied, there exists a set of formal criteria to which one must 
adhere in order to use an officially approved label. The OSI operates with a clean‐cut “Open Source Definition” 
(OSD) , which comprises ten such criteria. See chapter 2.3.6, under “FOSS licenses”. 
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2. Organization: The distributed and collaborative “Bazaar” development model 
(Raymond, 1997) promotes rapid evolution of the code, bug detection and fixing. 
Through self‐selection of tasks among community members, complexity is broken 
down and handled effectively. To guide this process, OSS projects adopt different 
forms of governance models. 
3. Legal framework: Licenses guarantee against copyright ownership fragmentation and 
discriminatory access to the code base. Depending on the normative underpinnings 
of the license, various legal terms further determine how the code can be applied 
and reused.  
These interconnected dimensions demonstrate the intricacy of OSS projects’ inner workings. 
Although several attempts have been made to suggest successful models for OSS projects 
(e.g. Fogel 2005), it seems overly simplistic to prescribe generic templates that work under 
all conditions. For that, the internal and contextual parameters are too numerous (Mikkonen 
and Vadén, 2009). Variables such as community size and composition, license category and 
governance type are linked through a complex equation. An alteration of one variable may 
trigger changes in others. To elucidate this intricate interdependence, I will in the following 
subchapters examine involved variables and seek to establish their mutual relevance.  
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2.3.1 Motivations and cultural Norms 
A 2009 study of Debian22 5.0, a popular GNU/Linux distribution, estimated that it consisted 
of close to 324 million lines of source code and would have cost around €6.1 billion to 
develop from scratch using a classical, proprietary development model (Amor et al, 2009).  
As a product of free‐ and open source collaboration, however, the principal costs involved 
were time and effort (i.e. individual opportunity costs), voluntarily donated by members of 
various communities. Thus, as Lerner and Tirole already inquired in 2002 (p.198):  
Why would thousands of top-notch software developers contribute for free  
to the creation of a public good? 
Numerous academics have sought to find answers to this question (e.g. Harhoff, Henkel, et 
al., 2003; von Hippel and Von Krogh, 2006). A recent paper (von Krogh et al., 2012) reviewed 
and summarized findings from relevant literature, and clustered ten “motivational 
categories” according to an intrinsic / extrinsic taxonomy23:  
Intrinsic   
1 Ideology Normative, e.g. FSF's proclaimed user freedoms or similar personal stance 
2 Altruism Selfless concern for the welfare of others without motive of own gain 
3 Kinship amity Based on sense of kinship and belonging to movement / group, e.g. community 
4 Enjoyment and fun As hobby, passion for experimentation or enjoyment of hacking 
Internalized Extrinsic   
5 Reputation "Peer reputation" (insiders) and "outside reputation" (general prestige) 
6 Reciprocity "Gift economy", i.e. giving in anticipation of likely reward in future 
7 Learning Acquire new skills and knowledge on inner workings of particular software 
8 Own‐use value Needs for given set of (improved) functionality 
Extrinsic   
9 Career Increase value on labor market by signaling talent and motivation 
10 Pay Monetary reward (in context of employment). 
Table 1: Condensation and interpretation of individual motivation for OSS participation, as summarized from literature in 
Appendix B by von Krogh, Haefliger, Spaeth and Wallin, 2012.  
According to the study, these individual motivations “rooted in people’s search for 
immediate outcomes” are important, but seem insufficient to explain other central issues 
(ibid., pp.656). Thus, it seeks to complement this “self‐determination view” with a “social 
                                                     
22 The Debian project is known for its adherence to both the FSF’s ideals on user freedoms and the “bazaar 
style” development methodology that is advocated by the OSI. The Debian distribution consists of an 
integrated stack of components originating from various FOSS* projects. 
23 The term “internalized extrinsic motivation” refers to motivation which the authors by definition ascribe as 
extrinsic, but can be internalized – i.e. “perceived as self‐regulating behavior rather than external impositions” 
(ibid. p. 653).  
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practice view” to explain “what moves OSS developers to (1) produce high‐quality work 
when they do, (2) engage in institutional change, or (3) sustain OSS development” (loc. cit.). 
At this point, the authors take on a more “holistic” and multi‐disciplinary approach, building 
on the social and moral philosophy of Alasdair MacIntyre (thus invoking terms as virtue and 
“good life”). Although this theoretical choice may seem somewhat eccentric, the authors 
preempt skepticism through an exegesis and informed, selective application of the theory. 
As such, their reasoning has merit: “Individuals are [also] motivated because, through 
participatory exposure to social practices, they learn what it makes sense to do; and, vice 
versa, by reflecting on the unity of life they shape social practices” (original emphasis, ibid. p. 
663‐4).  By unity of life, the authors take to mean “how the individual subjectively holds 
outcomes and actions to be consistent over time”. This is based on the assumption that 
individuals “want to reach or maintain consistency of action throughout their life—an 
ambition that values personal development and contextual events and points beyond the 
attainment of specific and immediate rewards.” From this “narrative of life” perspective 
“OSS development embedded in a social practice becomes meaningful and a way of life with 
its own pleasure, challenges, and other benefits.” Following, the paper provides a new 
“motivation–practice framework”  with a series of theoretical conjectures and propositions 
to answer the above posed questions (summarized in Appendix C). The propositions seem 
convincing, as are the suggested implications to OSS projects. Because OSS projects 
essentially aim to be arenas where heterogeneous motivations of individuals and institutions 
are played out in concert, it is important that resulting actions are in tune. This suggests that 
motivations by themselves need to be compatible to a certain extent, also taking into 
account individuals’ value‐informed, long‐term pursuits. Hence, in ANT‐terminology: 
Motivational factors constitute the underlying driving force in the socio‐technological 
ensembles of OSS projects – either through actors’ direct action, their indirect translation of 
will into other forms (e.g. by influencing a shared governance model) or through resulting 
inscribed imperatives (e.g. a chosen license and established rules for submission).  
As touched upon in the previous chapter, there are different normative camps and factions 
in the intertwined free‐ and open source movement. The Free Software Foundation’s (FSF) 
stance is that the software user by moral imperative should have access to the underlying 
source code in order to exercise underlying “freedoms” to study, change and redistribute it 
to others. The Open Source Initiative (OSI) also promotes open source code, but of a more 
instrumental and pragmatic reason – to allow software to effectively evolve through 
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collaborative, distributed innovation (see chapter 2.3.5 and Appendix B). Such normative 
variations echo a multitude of attitudes and cultures in the wider free‐ and open source 
community. The reader should note, however, that such differences are compatible to a 
large extent. The popular Ubuntu operating system24, for instance, successfully amalgamates 
arguments from both camps in its proclaimed philosophy25. Accordingly, it has become 
increasingly popular to use the more inclusive abbreviation of “FOSS”26 when speaking of 
both free‐ and open‐source software. As the FSF puts it27: 
The term “open source” software is used by some people to mean more or less the same 
category as free software. It is not exactly the same class of software: they accept some 
licenses that we consider too restrictive, and there are free software licenses they have not 
accepted. However, the differences in extension of the category are small: nearly all free 
software is open source, and nearly all open source software is free. We prefer the term “free 
software” because it refers to freedom—something that the term “open source“ does not do.  
Reconciliatory tendencies and overlapping categories notwithstanding, even subtle cultural 
differences may matter (Stewart and Gosain, 2006). This is because culture to a large extent 
defines the identity and purpose of software projects and their communities. In this context, 
an OSS project’s mission statement, governance model and legal framework can be 
interpreted as an expressive manifestation of communal identity and purpose – a 
differentiating cultural proclamation in formal jargon, as it were28.  
 
  
                                                     
24  Based on the Debian GNU / Linux distribution 
25  About Ubuntu – our philosophy. Retrieved may 14, 2012 from  
   http://www.ubuntu.com/project/about‐ubuntu/our‐philosophy 
26 Commonly used alternatives are “F/OSS”, and “FLOSS” (L for libre).  
27 Categories of free and nonfree software, Retrieved may 17, 2012 from  
    http://www.gnu.org/philosophy/categories.html 
28 To clarify, the legal framework is here understood to go beyond the choosing of a license, it may involve 
   differentiating additional terms and varying practices of implementation. 
16 
2.3.2 The Community 
The driving force behind any OSS project is a community of volunteering developers and 
users with a shared interest in the making, improvement and support for a given software. 
This chapter examines essential features of communities, and discusses relevant aspects 
concerning the building and preservation of them. 
Unless the product of a fork*, OSS projects typically start off without any community. During 
an incubation period, the initiator (project maintainer*) must build a sufficiently appealing 
program to spur interest of potential users and developers – what Raymond calls a 
“plausible promise”29: 
When you start community-building, what you need to be able to present is a plausible promise. 
Your program doesn't have to work particularly well. It can be crude, buggy, incomplete, and 
poorly documented. What it must not fail to do is (a) run, and (b) convince potential co-developers 
that it can be evolved into something really neat in the foreseeable future.   
In order to display vitality of the project and engage early adopters, it is important to 
“release early and often” and listen to feedback from users (see Appendix B, lesson 7). 
Likewise, “barriers to entry” should be kept low for both users and voluntary co‐developers. 
This is a “twofold task”, which according to Fogel (2005, pp.10‐13) adds complexity to the 
project’s initial presentation to the world: Software users and developers have different 
needs and expectations, so the project maintainer must be careful to address both 
audiences in parallel. Users may demand a slick homepage, intuitive installers and 
documentation, while developers require a well working community forum / mailing list and 
the facilitation of suitable toolkits (see chapter 2.3.4). In a commercial context, this becomes 
a question of building deliberate marketing strategies.  
Developers typically emerge from the user base, but also from elsewhere30: “drawn in by the 
technical challenge, kudos, or opportunity to improve or publicise their programming skills”. 
Given the existence of competing FOSS projects (i.e. offering similar functionality), 
differentiation and expectation management can serve as effective strategies to attract 
developers from elsewhere. Fogel suggests the use of a short and concise mission statement 
                                                     
29 Chapter “Necessary Preconditions for the Bazaar Style” in Raymond 1997, retrieved May 18, 2012 from  
    http://catb.org/esr/writings/homesteading/cathedral‐bazaar/ar01s10.html 
30 OSS Watch, How to build an open source community, retrieved May 19, 2012 from 
    http://www.oss‐watch.ac.uk/resources/howtobuildcommunity.xml 
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to announce the project’s purpose and identity. He exemplifies this by the mission 
statement used by OpenOffice.org (loc. cit.):  
To create, as a community, the leading international office suite that will run on all major 
platforms and provide access to all functionality and data through open-component based 
APIs and an XML-based file format. 
Besides technical differentiators, it clearly states that this is a community‐driven project (in 
spite of, or because of, the project being initiated by Sun Microsystems). This, apparently, is 
to appeal to “open” credentials of potential volunteers. Further, it positions itself as an 
international project, indicating demand and hospitality for developers from around the 
world. 
Strictly speaking, OSS communities need not be confined to free‐standing individuals. 
External entities with vested interests in OSS software (e.g. partners or third party providers 
of complementary offerings) are also inclined to contribute code, bug‐reports, legal help and 
financial resources. Depending on circumstance, the project may want to address such 
entities through a dedicated marketing channel and organizational unit. As this is only 
relevant for a few well‐established OSS projects (e.g. the Linux Kernel / Linux Foundation), it 
is a rarely incurred scenario. In the particular case of dual licensing, however, corporate 
participation in the community is the norm: The open source edition31 is then typically 
managed by an employed “community manager”, and the company’s developers partly 
contribute as members of the community. This provides an additional option of vitalizing the 
community with “synthetic” activity.  
                                                     
31 I.e. the edition that is licensed under an OSI‐approved license.  
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2.3.3 Governance 
OSS governance can be defined as the means of achieving the direction, control, and 
coordination of wholly or partially autonomous individuals and organizations on behalf of an 
OSS development project to which they jointly contribute. (Markus 2007, p.152) 
Whichever governance model a OSS project chooses to follow, it has considerable impact on 
stakeholders’ perception of the project as whole, as well as the community’s internal power 
distribution and modus operandi. As OSS Watch puts it32:  
There are almost as many variations of open source management strategies as there are open 
source projects. It is therefore critical that a project clearly communicates its policies and 
strategies to potential users and developers of the project's outputs. A clear governance model 
also allows potential contributors to understand how they should engage with the project [..]. In 
addition, it describes the quality control processes that help to assure potential users of the 
viability of the project. The development and communication of a clear and concise governance 
model is one of the most important steps a project can take towards sustainability through open 
development. 
Not all OSS projects start off with a formal governance model, but evolve from a natural 
initial state in which the project’s initiator serves as a benevolent dictator (BD). According to 
Fogel (ibid., p.60) one should think of a BD as "community‐approved arbitrator" or "judge":  
Generally, benevolent dictators do not actually make all the decisions, or even most of the 
decisions. It's unlikely that one person could have enough expertise to make consistently good 
decisions across all areas of the project, and anyway, quality developers won't stay around 
unless they have some influence on the project's direction. Therefore, benevolent dictators 
commonly do not dictate much. Instead, they let things work themselves out through discussion 
and experimentation whenever possible. They participate in those discussions themselves, but as 
regular developers, often deferring to an area maintainer who has more expertise. Only when it 
is clear that no consensus can be reached, and that most of the group wants someone to guide 
the decision so that development can move on, do they put their foot down and say "This is the 
way it's going to be." Reluctance to make decisions by fiat is a trait shared by virtually all 
successful benevolent dictators; it is one of the reasons they manage to keep the role. 
                                                     
32 OSS Watch, How to build an open source community, retrieved May 22, 2012 from 
    http://www.oss‐watch.ac.uk/resources/governanceModels.xml 
19 
Even large projects can be run according to a BD model. The most cited example is probably 
that of the Linux Kernel, which has been steered by Linus Torvalds since its inception. As 
with all dictatorships, however, there are inherent dangers: For one, the BD must hold a 
number of qualities in order to execute this role successfully (e.g. arbitration skills and the 
ability to delegate). Should the BD fail to adequately meet such minimum standards, he / she 
is likely to invoke dissatisfaction and schisms within the community (ultimately provoking a 
fork*). Second, even if the current BD performs outstandingly, there is the inevitable 
problem of succession – who / what model will take over when the BD eventually abdicates?  
An alternative governance model is meritocracy, as embraced by The Mozilla Foundation33:  
Mozilla is an open source project governed as a meritocracy. Our community is structured as 
a virtual organization where authority is distributed to both volunteer and employed 
community members as they show their abilities through contributions to the project. 
In practice, OSS projects do not need to restrict themselves to one single stereotypic model 
of governance. Rather, they tend to blend democratic, oligarchic, meritocratic and autocratic 
elements – even when governed by a “self‐appointed benevolent dictator for life”34. 
Research (e.g. O'Mahony and Ferraro, 2007) further suggests that the blend of such models 
may change as OSS projects mature. This makes sense. As scope and complexity grows and 
individuals raise to prominence, informal changes naturally occur. Formal changes can either 
follow to reflect informal ones, be based on a realization of an inadequate status quo, or be 
implemented pro‐actively in anticipation of emerging needs. Specialized projects may also 
be constituted under an umbrella of existing ones, with a limited mandate to adapt inherited 
government models (e.g. the Apache Software Foundation with its numerous progenies).  
In the context of commercial dual licensing, OSS governance becomes a key business 
management process. As such, it needs to be aligned with other business activities. 
Governance models of dual‐licensed OSS editions may therefore display a tendency towards 
commercial bias. To prevent the community from being provoked or alienated it may 
therefore seem imperative to balance commercial inclinations against “open” interests. But, 
as discussed in later chapters, this is not necessarily the case. 
                                                     
33 Mozilla Governance, retrieved June 6, 2012 from http://www.mozilla.org/about/governance.html 
34 Which is the case for Ubuntu. See http://www.ubuntu.com/project/about‐ubuntu/governance 
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2.3.4 Toolkits for Innovation and Development 
OSS projects rely heavily on technological enablers, most notably the Internet: “The 
widespread diffusion of Internet access in the early 1990s led to a dramatic acceleration of 
open source activity. The volume of contributions and diversity of contributors expanded 
sharply, and numerous new open source projects emerged […]” (Lerner and Tirole 2002, 
p.202). Through effective utilization of newsgroups, FTP‐servers and Email, communication 
costs were drastically reduced and geographically dispersed actors were able to join 
(Bonaccorsi and Rossi 2003). To further enhance efficiency, FOSS communities have since 
devised increasingly advanced ancillary tools35 for code editing36, issue tracking, testing, 
revision control, project management etc. The composition of an OSS project’s endorsed 
toolkit is largely determined by the project maintainer, but may also (depending on the 
governance model) be influenced by community members. Since technical enhancers 
embody inscribed imperatives of use and encourage different modes of operation, the 
choice and facilitation of shared tools is no trivial undertaking. Developers may hold 
expectations which the project maintainer is not able / willing to meet, or vice versa – the 
project maintainer may want to impose tools that could alienate the community. Likewise, a 
lack of competencies or resources (e.g. interest, attention or time) may lead to 
organizational inertia. But such shortcomings give little excuse nowadays, since services as 
SourceForge, Google Code and GitHub can provide ample functionality to OSS projects. 
OSS projects typically complement generic tools with specialized adaptations and in‐house 
kit, which they offer to developers (e.g. for automation of often incurred and / or precarious 
tasks) and end‐users (e.g. for diagnostics). Franke and von Hippel (2003) also propose user‐
friendly toolkits to facilitate customization and spur innovation amongst a heterogeneous 
users base 37 . As such technical aids can lower the barriers to entry and enhance 
development efficiency, it is important for the project maintainer to be aware of their 
potential and open to suggestions from the community (exemplified in next subchapter). 
                                                     
35 Often called CASE tools (computer‐aided software engineering). 
36 I.e. integrated development environments (IDEs, i.e. Eclipse), which are integrated with other development 
tools (e.g. versioning control systems, syntax checkers, bug trackers etc.). 
37 Further, what von Hippel terms User toolkits for innovation “allow manufacturers to actually abandon their 
attempts to understand user needs in detail in favor of transferring need‐related aspects of product and service 
development to users along with an appropriate toolkit.” (2001, p.247) 
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2.3.5 Innovation and development methodology 
The essence of open source is not the software. It is the process by which the software is created. 
[…] Production processes, or ways of making things, are of far more importance than the 
artifacts produced because they spread more broadly – Weber 2004, p. 56 
What sets OSS apart from conventional proprietary software is a methodology with an 
inherent focus on Internet‐enabled distributed development and innovation – widely 
denoted as the “Bazaar” development model. As Raymond (1997) rounds up his landmark 
essay on the subject38: 
Perhaps in the end the open-source culture will triumph not because cooperation is morally right 
or software "hoarding" is morally wrong (assuming you believe the latter, which neither Linus 
[Torvalds] nor I do), but simply because the closed-source world cannot win an evolutionary 
arms race with open-source communities that can put orders of magnitude more skilled time 
into a problem. 
What is particularly interesting about Raymond’s assumption of methodological supremacy, 
along with the pragmatic stance towards commercial interests, is the confidence with which 
it is presented. Clearly, Raymond was able to put forward convincing arguments for why 
open source, epitomized by the Bazaar model, would put “closed software” development 
methodologies to a challenge. It is the default methodological choice for OSS projects39, and 
has inspired emulation in both academia and the private sector. To be fair, many of its 
characteristics have always been intrinsic to academic research: open revealing and 
distribution of results, peer review and distributed collaboration. This is no coincidence. The 
Bazaar model is based on lessons learned from the making of Linux, which was incepted by 
Linus Torvalds in 1991 as he was graduate student at the University of Helsinki. There he 
became familiar with Minix, a minimalistic Unix clone made specifically for teaching 
purposes. In the absence of a free alternative and his preference for an Unix‐like system over 
MS DOS, he installed it on his computer. At the time, a free alternative40 had been in the 
                                                     
38 “The Cathedral and the Bazaar”, through which the term was popularized. Linus Torvalds, whom he here 
refers to, is the initiator and project coordinator of the Linux kernel – the core component of the GNU / Linux 
operating system (commonly referred to as just “Linux”). 
39 In various forms – not all OSS projects follow the model “to the letter”, or are even aware of it. But as its 
underlying philosophy is well reflected in the OSI’s Open Source Definition’s, they are innately bound to its 
guiding principles. It is important to note, however, that far from all projects manage to attract developer pools 
to sufficiently support the application of the model. See for example Healy and Schussman (2003). 
40 The GNU operating system (administered by the FSF’s GNU Project), with unfinished kernel named “Hurd”.  
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working, but was still missing its most central component – a kernel41. Torvalds therefore 
started to experiment on his own kernel – Linux. In August 1991 he announced the project 
to the Minix newsgroup42:  
I'm doing a (free) operating system (just a hobby, won't be big and professional like gnu) […]. 
This has been brewing since april, and is starting to get ready. I'd like any feedback on things 
people like/dislike in minix, as my OS resembles it somewhat […T]hings seem to work. This 
implies that I'll get something practical within a few months, and I'd like to know what features 
most people would want. Any suggestions are welcome […]:-) 
About a month later, with a working version now at hand, he posted a follow‐up (excerpts 
from ibid., with correction of minor typographic errors):  
Do you pine for the nice days of minix-1.1, when men were men and wrote their own device 
drivers? Are you without a nice project and just dying to cut your teeth on an OS you can try to 
modify for your needs? Are you finding it frustrating when everything works on minix? No more 
all-nighters to get a nifty program working? Then this post might be just for you :-) […] 
I can (well, almost) hear you asking yourselves "why?". Hurd will be out in a year (or two, or next 
month, who knows), and I've already got minix. This is a program for hackers by a hacker. I've 
enjoyed doing it, and somebody might enjoy looking at it and even modifying it for their own 
needs. It is still small enough to understand, use and modify, and I'm looking forward to any 
comments you might have. I'm also interested in hearing from anybody who has written any of 
the utilities/library functions for minix. If your efforts are freely distributable […] I'd like to hear 
from you, so I can add them to the system. 
A community of geographically scattered beta‐testers, code donators and co‐developers was 
born, and the project gained traction. Frequent releases and a growing number of peer‐
review “eyeballs” assured that bugs were spotted quickly and fixes timely distributed back to 
the community. Torvalds treated community members as an indisputable resource, and they 
responded in kind by becoming so. Although Torvalds’ position as the project’s undisputed 
leader was assured, he handled his co‐developers as what they were – free and autonomous 
agents with aligning interest. Any form of coercion, which is not uncommon in the context of 
employment, would have been futile. According to Raymond (1997 p.52), thus, “[t]he Linux 
                                                     
41 Responsible of managing a computer’s hardware resources and providing applications access to them. 
42 LINUX History, by Linus Torvalds, retrieved June 17, 2012 from 
http://www.cs.cmu.edu/~awb/linux.history.html 
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world behaves in many respects like a free market or an ecology, a collection of selfish 
agents attempting to maximize utility which in the process produces a self‐correcting 
spontaneous order more elaborate and efficient than any amount of central planning could 
have achieved.” Yet, Torvalds’ role as benevolent dictator was a coordinating prerequisite to 
this “self‐correcting spontaneous order”. As Larry McVoy (a community member at the time) 
put it in an interview of 200243: 
In my opinion, then and now, Linus [Torvalds] is what makes Linux great. He's the glue that 
holds it all together. Without him, Linux would splinter […]. 
All this was made possible by the Internet’s emergent ubiquity (Bonaccorsi and Rossi 2003), 
which Torvalds effectively utilized for code distribution and coordination. Still, most 
Internet‐enabled “toolkits for innovation” (see chapter 2.3.4), which FOSS developers take 
for granted today, were relatively crude or non‐existent at the time. For example, as Linux 
project was experiencing growing pains in 1998, the very same McVoy acknowledged44:  
It's clear that our fearless leader is, at the moment, a bit overloaded so patches may be 
getting lost. There are some of us, myself among them, that have been worried about this for 
a while and are working on a solution. 
The remedy he prescribed was the BitKeeper, a revision control system he himself had 
“conceived to keep Linus from getting burnt out”45. After testing it, Torvalds recognized that 
it was indeed “the best tool for the job” (ibid) and adopted it. However, the use of a 
commercial product by an OSS project was controversial on principle. And after its free 
provision was withdrawn amongst allegations of reverse‐engineering, Torvalds decided to 
develop his own open source alternative – git. It has since become the revision control 
system of choice for many software projects, even among commercial ones.  
Not only does this chain of events parade the Bazaar model in an explicatory fashion, but it 
also displays the capabilities of the individuals it attracts and efficiently engages for a shared 
purpose. For a more detailed understanding of the model, please see Appendix B. 
                                                     
43 Interview: Larry McVoy (May 28, 2002), retrieved June 18, 2012 from http://kerneltrap.org/node/222 
44 Post to the Linux Kernel Mailing list (September 30, 1998), titled “A solution for growing pains”,  
    retrieved June 18, 2012 from https://lkml.org/lkml/1998/9/30/122 
45 Feature: No More Free BitKeeper (April 5, 2005), retrieved June 18, 2012 from 
http://kerneltrap.org/node/4966 
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At this point it should be clarified that what is commonly  
referred to as the Linux operating system in fact is a 
composition of software originating from several projects, 
among them the Linux kernel and various GNU 
components. Hence, the FSF insists that it should rather 
be called GNU/Linux. Even if the latter naming 
convention is less popular in the OSI camp, it 
demonstrates how well FOSS software can work 
together in practice (see adjacent graphic46). In the context of 
integration and distribution, thus, the labels “free” and “open” are of 
little significance. The only  prerequisite is that all involved code bases are 
governed by compatible legal frameworks, which brings us to the next chapter.  
 
2.3.6 Legal Framework 
What Torvalds did not know when he conceived Linux was that another project was pursuing 
similar Internet‐enabled efforts from Berkeley47. A major contributing factor to Linux’ 
success, as is widely understood, was the legal limbo which impeded the competing project. 
While UC Berkeley and AT&T’s Bell Labs were entangled in a dispute over code ownership, 
Torvalds could offer a hospitable legal safe‐haven. His decision to distribute Linux under the 
GPL license48 was crucial in this regard, and gave him a competitive advantage: It allowed 
the Linux kernel to be liberally intermixed with legally compatible code from external 
sources (e.g. GNU), and remixed by anyone into customized “distros”. In 1993, when the 
dust started to settle at Berkeley, Linux had already gained superior momentum. As Torvalds 
publicly recognized four years later49:  
Making Linux GPL'd was definitely the best thing I ever did.  
  
                                                     
46 FSF image of GNU and Linux penguin, from The GNU web site, entitled: The Dynamic Duo: The Gnu and the  
    Penguin in flight. It is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution‐Share Alike 3.0 Unported license. 
47 386BSD, also called “Jolix”, of which FreeBSD and NetBSD are popular offshoots. 
48 GNU General Public License version 2, released by the FSF in 1991, used by Linux as of version 0.12 (1992).  
49 Hiroo Yamagata (August 5, 1997), The Pragmatist of Free Software: Linus Torvalds Interview.   
    Retrieved June 26, 2012 from http://www.tlug.jp/docs/linus.html 
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Copyright, licensing and collaborative innovation 
Copyright poses a challenge to collaborative innovation and development. This is because 
changes to someone’s code (derivative work) cannot be distributed without explicit consent 
of the original author. One way to circumvent this problem is to develop a patch (i.e. 
technically compatible complementary code), and distribute it independently from the 
original work. But even with such a mode of collaboration, challenges remain: 
• Other developers cannot modify the patch without its author’s explicit consent (i.e. the 
same problem, but related to a different chunk of code and copyright holder). 
• Compatibility issues: Patches that build upon the original software are dependent on a 
predictable mode of operation. Therefore, changes to the original software pose a risk of 
rendering patches incompatible. 
• Legal uncertainty: Even if all contributors informally agree to let others change and 
redistribute their code (such as IBM’s “non‐assertion” pledge), there is no guarantee that 
all involved parties will waive their copyright indefinitely. 
Of course, if all collaboration is done within a legal framework of employment and all 
collaborators work for the same entity, then copyright ownership is likely assigned to that 
entity by default. Conversely, in the context of open collaboration, other legal mechanisms 
have been devised to administer code ownership under a centralized regime (e.g. 
foundations or corporations serving as project maintainers). The most common forms are: 
• Contributor License Agreements (CLAs): A CLA is a formalized agreement, signed by 
copyright holders, which grants rights for contributions to be redistributed by the project 
maintainer. Further, CLAs “simplify the process of collaborating with partners on projects 
as they can form part of a broader collaboration agreement.”50 Thus, as commonly 
defined, CLAs do not involve any formal transfer of copyright ownership, but secure the 
project maintainer extensive rights of use51 . 
                                                     
50 OSS Watch, retrieved Jan 15, 2012 from http://www.oss‐watch.ac.uk/resources/cla.xml  
51 E.g., the Individual Contributor License Agreement V2.0 of the Apache Software Foundation states: “You 
hereby grant to the Foundation and to recipients of software distributed by the Foundation a perpetual, 
worldwide, non-exclusive, no-charge, royalty-free, irrevocable copyright license to reproduce, prepare derivative 
works of, publicly display, publicly perform, sublicense, and distribute Your Contributions and such derivative 
works.”. Retrieved Jan 15, 2012 from http://www.apache.org/licenses/icla.txt  
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• Copyright Assignment Agreements (CAAs): A more stringent approach is to require 
collaborators to assign their copyright (or significant parts of it) to a project maintainer. 
This owning entity “then licences back to the contributor the licence to exercise all rights 
associated with the copyright material and the contribution”52. 
As copyright ownership is a valuable asset (see next page), CAAs are naturally favored by 
commercial entities. Even the FSF has encouraged this approach for software that is 
published under the GPL, claiming procedural benefits should the need for copyright 
enforcement arise53:  
In order to make sure that all of our copyrights can meet the recordkeeping and other 
requirements of registration, and in order to be able to enforce the GPL most effectively, FSF 
requires that each author of code incorporated in FSF projects provide a copyright assignment, 
and, where appropriate, a disclaimer of any work-for-hire ownership claims by the 
programmer's employer. That way we can be sure that all the code in FSF projects is free code, 
whose freedom we can most effectively protect, and therefore on which other developers can 
completely rely.  
This requirement is only mandatory to FSF projects’ contributors – other projects using the 
GPL are not bound by it. Thus, one of the reasons for not upgrading the Linux Kernel’s GPL 
license from version 2 to 3 is the unfeasibility of obtaining the required consent from all 
copyright holders of the Linux code repository54.  
Naturally, the legal terms of CLAs, CAAs and the like vary, and cover a wide spectrum of 
possible terms of use and ownership distribution. Their actual application is prescribed by a 
projects governance model. Typically, community members are required to give explicit 
consent before obtaining “commit rights” (i.e. a procedural prediction for their contributions 
to be included in the code base). This provides the project maintainer exclusive gatekeeper 
capabilities.  
  
                                                     
52 GPL software: Ownership, retrieved Jan 15, 2012 from     
    http://bulkzooi.wordpress.com/legal‐overview/gpl‐software‐ownership/  
53 “Why the FSF gets copyright assignments from contributors“, by Professor Eben Moglen, Columbia University 
Law School. Retrieved Jan 16 2011 from http://www.gnu.org/licenses/why‐assign.html 
54 In 2004 the Linux Kernel project introduced its own variation of an CLA, which requires contributions to be 
“signed off” by their authors to attest a “Developer’s Certificate of Origin” (DCO). 
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The benefits of copyright ownership 
It is the copyright holder’s sole privilege to decide under which conditions his source code is 
to be modified, distributed and used. Even if it is already licensed under the GPL, the owning 
entity can choose not to apply the same terms to itself. Thus, the owner has the option to 
release the same source code under several different licenses (dual‐/multi‐licensing). While 
CLAs authorize project maintainers to license the collective code repository to third parties, 
they typically dictate which license categories that can be applied. Such limitations can pose 
a challenge at a later stage. For example, if the project’s code was to be distributed as an 
integrated whole with other open source software packages, license compatibility issues 
could arise – i.e. licenses with contradictory requirements that make some integrated 
distributions unfeasible. Of such reasons, the right to re‐license the software can be of great 
benefit. Although re‐licensing is possible with CLAs (Jensen and Scacchi, 2011), the process is 
far easier with CAAs. Thus, to summarize, CAAs are sought of two purposes (Rosen in ibid., p. 
13): 
1. So the project can defend itself in court without the participation and approval of its 
contributors. 
2. To give the project (and not the contributor) the sole right to make (re)licensing 
decisions. 
There are also examples of joint license agreements, which provide “the contributor and 
project […] equal and independent copyright to contributed source” (loc. cit.). However, 
copyright ownership has limited value to single contributors, since atomic pieces of code 
have little utility outside the context of peer contributions. The project maintainer, on the 
other hand, would still hold the aggregate value of all congruent contributions.  
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FOSS licenses 
The Free Software Foundation (FSF) has published a set of criteria for “free software” 
licenses 55. Correspondingly, the Open Source Initiative (OSI) has published its set of 
requirements56. Both maintain lists of officially certified licenses, which overlap to a great 
extent. This is why many open source projects, such as the Linux Kernel (proclaimed as open 
source), apply FSF ‐authored licenses. 
In essence, [t]o be OSI [or FSF] certified, the software must be distributed under a license that 
guarantees the right to read, redistribute, modify, and use the software freely (Deek and 
McHugh, 2007, p.244). This is to grant anyone (non‐discriminatory) the right to: 
• Make copies and distribute the software freely 
• Full access to the source code 
• Modify the source code and redistribute derivative work  
Beyond that, FOSS licenses fall in one of two main categories. Restrictive (“copyleft”) 
licenses (such as the GPL) contain reciprocal (“share‐alike”) provisions, which dictate any 
derivative (or integrated) work to be distributed under the same licensing terms. Hence, 
copyleft licenses are hereditary and self‐perpetuating by nature. In contrast, permissive 
licenses57 impose few restrictions on how the software is redistributed or integrated with 
other code58. 
While permissive licenses maximize legal compatibility with other software, copyleft licenses 
are meant to ensure that the community keeps control over the code and maintains access 
to external modifications. Proponents of the latter typically base their stance on ethical 
principles of users’ freedoms59, whereas advocates of permissive licenses stress the practical 
advantage of widespread software applicability through unrestrained reuse of code.  
                                                     
55 The Free Software Definition, retrieved Jan 13, 2012 from http://www.gnu.org/philosophy/free‐sw.html 
56 The Open Source Definition (Annotated), retrieved Jan 13, 2012 from http://www.opensource.org/osd.html 
57 Often referred to as “research” or “academic” style licenses, as they are widely used by academic institutions 
58 I.e., they typically allow for redistribution with additional license terms (even reciprocal or proprietary). 
59 Freedom or Power?, by Bradley Kuhn and Richard Stallman. Retrieved Jan 13, 2012 from  
    http://www.gnu.org/philosophy/freedom‐or‐power.html 
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License compatibility and license augmentation 
One fundamental objective of free‐ and open source software is “to promote the free 
exchange of ideas and technology without fear of infringing the rights of others” (Morin, 
Urban, et al. ,2012, pp. 3‐4). As such (loc. cit.),  
code licensed under like‐minded FOSS terms should be freely combinable to create new 
products. Compatibility is the attribute of software licenses that allows combining of 
program code. To be compatible, license terms must be free of contradictory or mutually 
exclusive requirements. Alas, some FOSS licenses contain terms “incompatible” with other 
FOSS licenses, thereby diluting the ability to easily combine code. 
Generally speaking, the more permissive a license, the more likely it is to be compatible with 
other licenses. Thus, source code governed by a truly permissive license can be combined 
with code administered by virtually any form of license (even proprietary or copyleft). As a 
result, the combined code base must always adhere to the most restrictive terms of involved 
licenses – hence the term “viral”, which is often applied to copyleft licenses. Naturally, the 
same logic applies to license augmentation when no code merger is involved: Truly 
restrictive licenses leave no room for augmentation (unless explicitly stated for specific 
purposes60), while permissive licenses give few reasons to do so – they may even allow 
binary (closed) code to be redistributed and embedded without disclosing the source (ibid.).  
  
                                                     
60 E.g. section 7 (“Additional terms”) of the GPL version 3  
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2.3.7 OSS Business Models 
“No matter who you are, most of the smartest people work for someone else.” – Joy’s Law61 
While established enterprises utilize OSS to build competitive advantage, OSS startups have 
engraved it in their very DNA. Depending on their business model, market entrants harness 
it differently. The most generic OSS business models can be summarized as such: 
• Platform providers: This is the business model pioneered by Red Hat. The company 
assembles and adapts various OSS packages into optimized quality certified software 
distributions. The firm also benefits from an open source community62, which 
supports in‐house innovation and development capabilities. Revenue is generated by 
offering supplementary professional services (migration, integration, management, 
support, training etc.) that go along with commercial “enterprise editions”. 
• Consultancy services: This model is employed by companies that do not directly 
engage in the development of OSS, but focus on providing consultancy services 
relating to pre‐existing software solutions. An example is the identification and 
integration of fitting OSS offerings based on specific customer needs. 
• Proprietary components: Open source licenses allow OSS code to be integrated with 
proprietary plugins63. The rationale is to satisfy specific customer needs that are not 
met by the open source solution itself. The drawback of this model is that the 
proprietary software over time may be replaced by a pure open source substitute if 
this functionality attracts enough attention by open source communities.  
• Dual licensing (multi licensing): This strategy can be defined as a meta‐business 
model, which supports the application of parallel approaches for targeted market 
segments. The main rationale is to draw the benefits of an open source community 
and brand, whilst at the same time allowing commercial distribution of the software 
under differentiated non‐OSS terms.  
Naturally, these stereotypic forms can be intermixed into more complex business models.  
                                                     
61 Attributed to William Nelson Joy, co‐founder of Sun Microsystems 
62 For the OSS Fedora distribution, which has a mutual beneficial relationship with Red Hat. 
63 Permissive licenses allow tight integration, while restrictive licenses may require functional encapsulation   
   (e.g. using a permissively licensed “bridge” module to load proprietary plugins at runtime). 
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2.4   Commercial Open Source Software 
I've always wondered where the word "oxymoron" came from. What does "oxy" have to do with 
"moron"? What about the words "commercial" and "open source"; do these words form an 
oxymoron when combined in one phrase? – Sterne and Herring, 2006 
In spite (or because) of its semantic ambiguity, the term commercial open source software 
(COSS) is widely used for marketing purposes. Arguably, such protuberant use of “open 
source” implies a certain appeal amongst investors, customers and OSS community 
members – or at the least that it is perceived as “kosher”. However, as COSS may indicate a 
variety of business models, a clarification is required for academic use. This thesis will apply 
the term as initially understood by Dirk Riehle, who recently found it necessary to rename 
the title of his 2009 paper to avoid confusion64. What he now calls “single‐vendor” COSS 
entails the following (Riehle 2012, p.5): 
Single-vendor commercial open source software projects are open source software projects that 
are owned by a single firm that derives a direct and significant revenue stream from the 
software. […] Using a single-vendor open source approach, firms can get to market faster with a 
superior product at lower cost than possible for traditional competitors. 
Building on our understanding of OSS from the previous chapter, this classification infers (1) 
that an OSS (preferably OSI‐compliant) license governs the source code, which to a certain 
extent is developed by an OSS community under the auspices of the firm. And (2), that some 
form of copyright assignment mechanism assures the firm legal ownership of the entire code 
base65, and thus the exclusive right to relicense it under proprietary terms. Following, COSS 
applications are likely to be distributed under at least two licenses – one providing 
“unrestricted use” (community edition), and one intended for commercial purposes (Capra 
and Wasserman, 2008). The two versions of the software may differ, “with the commercial 
version including features that are not present in the unrestricted version. In that situation, 
the commercial version of the software typically includes some closed source code” (ibid, 
pp.1‐2). 
  
                                                     
64 From "The Commercial Open Source Business Model" to “The Single-Vendor Commercial Open Source 
Business Model”. See Riehle, 2012 
65 Or alternatively, the firm does not accept outside contributions to the core code repository.  
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To fully understand COSS as a business model, one also needs to comprehend its intrinsic 
components: Intellectual property rights, revenue sources and a commercially steered open 
source community66: 
As the figure shows, these aspects can be  
interpreted as interlocking cogwheels, 
which in concert drive the COSS 
apparatus. On the face of it, the 
implied dynamics appear simple. 
In reality, however, the picture is far 
more complex. It is the COSS firm that 
acts as the chief mechanic, and thus is in 
power to determine the shape and relative strength 
of each component. Yet, other exogenous forces are also 
at play, and insufficient lubrication of friction points can lead the  
entire machinery to break down.  
This chapter addresses each of the three components in turn, before discussing issues 
relating to COSS community governance: Fairness, trust and community heterogeneity. With 
the theoretical foundations of OSS and COSS then firmly established, it will then conclude 
with an integrated view of the system as a whole.  
 
  
                                                     
66 Dirk Riehle (2009), The Business Model of Commercial Open Source Software, p.7. Retrieved Mar 13, 2012 
from http://dirkriehle.com/wp‐content/uploads/2009/08/Commercial‐Open‐Source‐v2.pdf. 
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2.4.1 Intellectual Property Rights 
According to Riehle (ibid, p.9), the COSS model is founded on two legal preconditions, of 
which the first should be familiar to the reader: 
1. Full control over intellectual property rights (copyright, patents and trademarks), is 
instrumental in maintaining the exclusive rights for relicensing and branding. 
2. An open source license that is suited to “drive adoption” and “stall possible 
competition”. 
Riehle argues that reciprocal (copyleft) licenses “like the GPL” are well suited for that 
purpose: They effectively hamper the reuse of code by competitors under proprietary terms, 
and require any improvements by others to be disclosed. In fact, a high‐quality and well 
established FOSS‐licensed product may by itself have an preemptive effect on competition: 
Its mere existence rises barriers to entry by being offered at virtually no cost. Meanwhile, 
the COSS firm can relicense and profitably distribute the software (either as binary‐ or 
source code) to OEMs*, ISVs* and VARs* that do not wish to be subject to a copyleft license 
(e.g. in order to embed or combine the code in a proprietary product). Likewise, it can sell 
commercial user licenses of enhanced editions (e.g. “professional” or “enterprise”). Last but 
not least, it can benefit from providing open APIs67 or permissively licensed “bridge” 
modules to facilitate easy integration with complementary offerings. 
In academia, the segmentation of code according to legally differentiated boundaries has 
become known as “IP modularity” (Henkel and Baldwin, 2010). COSS companies may draw 
the boundaries differently according to individual assessment of tradeoffs: Too restrictive 
boundaries (i.e. in proprietary terms) are likely to reduce value creation by the help of 
outsiders. On the other hand, if the boundaries are too lax (i.e. in favor of open source 
innovation) the firm’s prospects of value appropriation are hampered. Likewise, the degree 
of modularity (in terms of fragmentation and / or overlaps) determines the costs of setting 
up, monitoring and enforcing the technological‐legal IP framework. Hence, “the optimal 
modular structure for capturing value is not necessarily the same as the optimal structure 
for creating value” (ibid. p.14, original emphasis).   
                                                     
67 Application Programming interfaces, which allow runtime compatibility. 
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2.4.2 Revenue sources and funding 
COSS companies can apply different business models in combination, and draw revenues 
from a number of sources. These are, according to Riehle (ibid. pp. 9‐10, with my own 
augmentations):  
• Core product: Targeted at OEMs, ISVs and VARs, who “may pay for a commercial 
license to receive certification or indemnification or to embed the software into their 
products without having their own code touch open source code”. 
• Value‐added product: Targeted at professional / enterprise users that require 
functionality beyond basic features of the community edition. COSS companies 
typically offer convenient upgrade from the community edition, which thus serves as 
a teaser / trial version. 
• Operational comfort: To “ensure that the software reliably fulfills its duty” customers 
may want to pay for additional services, such as technical support, real‐time 
monitoring or regular patching (bug fixes and quality assured upgrades). 
• Consulting: To get the software fully operational, customers may want to pay for 
consulting services for installation, integration, customization and training. 
In addition, one could add hosting in cases where the software can be accessed through a 
client (e.g. a Web browser). Such a “Software as a Service” (SaaS) delivery model typically 
involves additional technical resources, which can be packaged and sold according to specific 
customer demands (like storage capacity and provision of complementary software). 
The diversity of revenue sources, and particularly high margin licensing, makes COSS 
companies popular among investors. An open source version (which drives adoption and 
innovation) and active community (implying reduced development, support and marketing 
costs) can further increase prospective value. Meanwhile, the 2008 acquisition of MySQL68 
by Sun Microsystems for USD 1bn has demonstrated that highly profitable COSS exits are 
possible. Accordingly, COSS companies “have attractive valuations and can raise capital at 
parity with proprietary software vendors” (Olson, 2005, p.79).  
                                                     
68 MySQL raised USD 1m through venture funding in 2001, USD 19.5m in 2003 and USD 18.5m in 2006. 
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2.4.3 The role and composition of the COSS community 
Riehle (2012, p.11), in reference to an interview69 with former CEO of MySQL, Mårten 
Mickos, maintains that “almost all of the core product development work is carried out by 
the commercial [COSS] firm, with occasional contributions from the community”. This claim 
is substantiated by others, like Capra and Wasserman (2008). They studied three COSS 
companies, none of which had more than 20% of their code base derived from community 
contributions70. Mickos explains why this is the case for MySQL (in ibid, pp.15‐16):  
The deeper you go into the core of the database engine, the more difficult it is for somebody to 
contribute because it takes five years to learn. If you build something on the outskirts of the 
kernel – some tool or function that you add on top of it – then it is much easier because there’s 
less risk that you will mess up the whole product. But something great can emerge out of many 
tiny-looking contributions. 
Further, volunteers who demonstrate their skill by actually making it into the core and 
contributing valuable code make likely candidates for employment by the company. In a 
sense, therefore, the community gets crowded out from the core of the software. That also 
makes sense from a managerial perspective. The commercial development process is guided 
by stringent internal roadmaps, with a selective focus on particular milestones. This is 
unlikely to blend well with informal bazaar‐style development (Scacchi, 2002; O'Mahony and 
Bechky, 2008). Much better, then, to direct the community’s attention to peripheral 
functionality – which at any rate provides more low‐hanging fruits for part‐time volunteers. 
Peripheral functionality also gives the most immediate and tangible utility to the user, and is 
therefore well suited for user‐driven innovation. For, as Mickos explains (in loc. cit.): “Their 
No.1 reason is that they are contributing so that they will get, in return, a better functioning 
product. They are looking after their own business interests”. This understanding is 
supported by Shah (2006), who distinguishes between “open” and “gated” communities, the 
latter referring to communities with restricted access to the development process due to 
COSS companies’ patronage and control. She established that gated communities are 
“populated almost exclusively by need‐driven participants” (ibid. p.1004), whereas 
                                                     
69 Former CEO of MySQL AB. See An Interview with Marten Mickos, The Oh-So-Practical Magic of Open-Source 
Innovation, MIT Sloan Management Review, Vol. 50, No. 1 (Fall 2008), 16. 
70 This percentage does not include contributions by non‐employees who have obtained regular compensations 
by the COSS firm. It may however imply irregular compensations, such as “bounties”, which some companies 
use as an incentive.  
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“enjoyment” is a more predominant motivational factor in open communities. Further, she 
suggests that many members of gated communities inhabit an initial reluctance to adopt 
gated software, and only do so when they cannot find an adequate open alternative. This 
also resonates with Steward et. al. (2006, p.133), in that “an association with a market 
organization could dampen enthusiasm among some volunteer developers because certain 
tenets of the open source culture seem to value independence from organizational 
constraints and, in some cases, disdain of profit motives” (in reference to DiBona et al. 1999, 
Stewart and Gosain 2006). As one anonymous  respondent puts it (in Shah 2006, p. 1009): 
I answer questions and stuff, but I don't feel the need to contribute my changes to the 
community. It's time consuming and I don't know if [the corporate sponsor] will do anything with 
it... .At the end of the day, they make the decisions with their commercial licensees in mind. 
(Long-term participant, gated source community, United States). 
And another, in a more resentful tone (loc. cit.): 
I make the changes that I really need and so does everyone else and we benefit from one 
another.... There are a lot of things the project still needs that I keep asking [the corporate 
sponsor] to develop... they are not absolutely critical, but they'd take the software to the next 
level and expand its capabilities... if I develop it and then [the corporate sponsor] says I can't let 
others see it or work on it or use it in whatever way that makes sense – now come on! That's not 
how it works! (Long-term participant, gated source community, United States). 
Although not explicitly stated, both citations raise a commonly professed sensation of COSS 
software – namely that the community edition is deliberately kept limited in quality, utility 
and / or performance. This strategy, often termed “damaged good” or “crippleware”, allows 
a COSS company more scope for commercial product differentiation and price 
discrimination, while it effectively repels cannibalization threats posed by the community 
edition. On the other hand, it is likely to alienate community members who wish to push the 
open source code towards its potential. For that reason, COSS companies are unlikely to 
confess to the pursuit of such a strategy. But one would probably be naïve to believe that 
they are not inclined to subtly follow it at least to some degree. Even when not the case, 
mere prejudice, mistrust and suspicion of its application can have significant effects on 
community recruitment and motivation.  
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In addition to ex‐ante self‐selection by users and contributors, migrations may occur when 
long‐term expectations are not sufficiently met by the COSS firm. But given various forms of 
lock‐in71, which are likely to ensue once the software has been firmly adopted, a desire to 
leave can be offset by implied switching costs. Disgruntled community members may then 
become “captive” to the software and reluctantly linger on. In a worst case scenario, an 
aggrieved community constituency may eventually incite a partial exodus under the flag of a 
competing OSS project (fork). 
At this point, it is important to remember that far from all users and contributors are 
freewheeling agents of sovereign will. As Mickos implied above, COSS contributions are to a 
large extent driven by commercial incentives. Customers and partners of the COSS company 
have vested interests in the software, and their employees represent a considerable share of 
community activity. Similarly, third party entities contribute complementary modules (e.g. 
connectors) and concurrent updates to increase the value of their own software. Even 
employees of COSS firms tend to be represented in communities (e.g. in forums). Whether 
pecuniary rewarded contributors should qualify as “real” community members remains a 
question of definition, and depends on the weight one puts on “voluntariness” as an 
absolute criterion. For all practical reasons, however, they are – which may explain why 
enjoyment is a relatively underrepresented motivational factor in gated communities.  
Summarizing, we can say that COSS (gated) communities generally differ from open 
communities in at least three regards:  
1. Governance and control: The firm sways regulative and operative control over the 
development process. It serves the function of a “benevolent dictator” not 
uncommon in conventional OSS projects, albeit with an inherent commercial motive. 
2. Area of development: The firm tends to dominate the development of core 
functionality, while it encourages and benefits from the community’s primary focus 
on peripheral complementary functionality.  
3. Motivation: COSS communities predominantly attract utility‐motivated users and 
developers, many of whom represent commercial vested interests in the software.   
                                                     
71 E.g. acquisition of skills / training, integrated work‐flows and complex data storage structures.  
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2.4.4 Governance: Fairness, trust and community heterogeneity 
As just established, COSS projects tend to be firmly controlled and governed by a commercial 
entity. COSS communities thus seem to be at the mercy of their patrons, yet they in turn rely 
on the allegiance of their communities. According to Harhoff and Mayrhofer (2010, pp. 141‐
142), hybrid community‐firm modes of collaborative innovation “will be sustainable only if 
the parties involved receive a sufficiently high benefit from the relationship and as long as 
the norms of the community, in particular with regard to sentiments of fair treatment, are 
not violated.” This, they argue, is most likely achieved through a stable relationship in which 
mutual trust is fostered by two types of fairness: 
• Distributional Fairness: “when the actual distribution of benefits is perceived as fair.” 
• Procedural Fairness: “when at least the procedures and criteria by which benefits are being 
divided are perceived as fair”. 
The two seem innately related – one might even say that the first is an operational 
manifestation of the latter (i.e. procedures and criteria as they are actually being applied). 
But while procedural fairness is reasonably easy to gauge72, distributional fairness can only 
be judged by assessing successions of unilateral actions and bilateral interactions over 
time73. This may explain the focal role of “learning experiences”, which Harhoff and 
Mayrhofer attribute to the building of trust (loc. cit.): 
Hybrid innovation processes […] have a greater chance of becoming stable over time as the 
parties involved accumulate experience and build trust in each other. Any violation of norms of 
behavior can disrupt this process.  
Interestingly, Harhoff and Mayrhofer imply copyright appropriation to be potentially 
regarded as a breach of trust. This reasoning may seem instinctively implausible, since 
copyright assignment is the norm in COSS projects. Commercial copyright consolidation is an 
unlikely scenario to incur for previously distributed ownership arrangements, as any 
substantial community of volunteers would be likely to fend off such a transition. 
                                                     
72 On the grounds that, in ANT‐terminology, procedures and criteria for distribution of ownership / control are 
represented by the translation of underlying intentions into inscribed artefacts (e.g. licenses and formalized 
rules). As such, these artefacts constitute actants in their own right, and serve as mediating agents that 
prescribe fairly predictable patterns and scope for interaction. 
73 Since inscriptions can leave room for varying interpretations and be subjected to opposing interests (or “anti‐
programs”) in the COSS actor‐network. Moreover, procedures and criteria for distribution can be altered as a 
result of constructive negotiation or opportunistic behavior, thereby changing the basis for actual distribution. 
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Disapproval of commercial ownership can therefore be understood as a motivational ex‐
ante self‐selection factor. Yet, as established in the previous chapter, even those who value 
independence from organizational constraints or disdain of profit motives find their way into 
COSS communities. In line with Harhoff and Mayrhofer, therefore, appropriation also has an 
ex‐post effect on trust and perceived fairness. This, according to Fogel (2005, p.164) is 
“bound to raise tensions at some point, at least with some volunteers”. 
Another trust‐related aspect of copyright attribution is a commonly shared fear among 
voluntary contributors that the commercial entity may eventually “take the project private”. 
This would happen “if the company failed to license its further work as Open Source, and 
continued development as a proprietary product while abandoning the users and developers 
in the Open Source community” (Perens, 2011). In this light, copyright assignment is likely 
perceived as an “unconditional gift to the company with no quid‐pro‐quo for the Open 
Source developer” (loc. cit.)74. Such perceptions carry implicit connotations of unfair 
distribution of ownership and control, and may explain observations by Shah (2006, p.1009):  
In describing their activities within the gated source community, participants voiced blatant 
disapproval of two elements of the governance structure: The level of code control held by the 
sponsor (the sponsor is the only actor able to make changes to the source code) and ownership 
by the corporate sponsor. 
The important question is whether such views are representative within and across COSS 
communities. Community heterogeneity can be measured along multiple dimensions. In 
terms of motivation, we have already established that contributions in gated communities 
are predominantly utility‐driven. This does not mean that other forms of motivation cannot 
possibly be nurtured and utilized, rather that gated communities appear to provide 
unsuitable environments for them. It may be futile or counterproductive to cater for innately 
hostile dispositions towards commercial ownership, but it is conceivable that unrealized 
potentials can be tapped by loosening institutional control and giving more room for 
diversity. For example, Shah (2006, p.2012) notes that COSS firms may inadvertently 
dominate the flow of communications “through a desire to influence the direction of the 
project or because firm employees represent a substantial portion of the participant pool 
                                                     
74 Note: Guaranteed “user freedoms” to derived work are commonly regarded as an essential quid‐pro‐quo 
among voluntary FOSS developers. Although copyleft licenses are intended to insure these conditions,  
they can be effectively circumvented through consolidated copyright ownership.  
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[..]. This may act to inhibit developers from voicing heterogeneous views, resulting in 
decreased volunteer participation.” As a known COSS symptom, firms may thus consider to 
restrain their dominance over communication flows. Similarly, to build trust and dispel fears 
about projects being “taken private”, Perens (ibid) recommends COSS firms to offer their 
communities a formalized “covenant” in exchange of copyright attribution.  
Since managerial trade‐offs may entail partial dilution of powers, one needs to be observant 
about the minimum degree of control required to sustain a COSS business model. Capra and 
Wasserman (2008) developed a framework75 to evaluate managerial styles in open source 
projects, and used it to asses three COSS projects (OpenOffice, MySQL and SugarCRM). They 
identified four “fundamental governance dimensions”76 according to which the projects 
were measured along a continuum between “fully open” and “fully closed” extremities. By 
implication, all these governance dimensions relate to fairness and control (e.g. by whom 
and how contributors’ code is evaluated and allowed into the official repository). Capra and 
Wasserman unveiled substantial variety between the studied projects, which suggests that a 
generic COSS business model indeed allows for a range of managerial styles77. As such, 
community heterogeneity is not merely a phenomenon to observe and handle reactively. 
Through deliberate management, COSS companies can pro‐actively cultivate or mollify 
community constituencies in order to achieve a suitable fit78. This does not only concern 
motivational factors. Skills, experience and needs also tend to be unevenly distributed 
among and between communities (Franke and von Hippel 2003, Shah 2006). Franke and von 
Hippel (ibid.) suggest “user friendly” toolkits as effective measures to address challenges of 
multiplicity in needs and technical proficiency79. Harhoff and Mayrhofer also consider skills 
as relevant. Based on their assumption that expert users are “least deterred from switching” 
they go on to infer that “[t]echnical sophistication may be highly correlated with aversion to 
                                                     
75 The “Software Project Governance Framework” (SPGF) 
76 (1) Contribution (relative amount of voluntary code development), (2) Project leadership (distributed vs. 
hierarchical decision making), (3) working practices (geographically distributed and virtual communication vs. 
physical proximity and face‐to‐face interaction), and (4) testing (community peer‐review vs. formalized “in‐
house” quality assurance of code contributions – i.e. a powerful gatekeeper role). 
77 OpenOffice has after the 2008 study experienced significant turmoil: LibreOffice as a fork in 2010, based on 
concerns that Oracle would introduce more restrictive terms or discontinue it (in relation to Oracle’s 
acquisition of SUN Microsystems, which was the previous project sponsor); and a transferal of ownership and 
control from Oracle to the Apache Software Foundation in 2011. One should note that none of these changes 
are related to SUN’s then management of the project.  
78 This concerns both existing and potential community members.  
79 In terms of lowering barriers to entry for unskilled / inexperienced users, catalyzing innovation, and 
facilitating customization according to unforeseen needs. Also see chapter 1.3.4 
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commercialization” (ibid p. 142). Interesting as it may be, this conjecture looks overly 
simplistic and speculative. But the reader should beware of committing an association fallacy 
by discrediting the authors’ paper on this basis – the premise of expert mobility stands in its 
own right. Already in 2000, the renowned Orbiten Free Software Survey (Ghosh and Prakash) 
suggested high mobility among technology savvy contributors. It showed that a majority of 
community members participate in only one project, while a minority (some of which are 
institutions) contribute to numerous ones. Likewise, a mere 10% of authors accounted for 
over 70% of the combined code base (of the 12,706 surveyed projects). To my knowledge, 
however, no differentiating composition of motivational factors has been attributed to 
prolific contributors, nor have any forms of governance that agree particularly well with 
their (perhaps characteristic) preferences. The same goes for heterogeneity in terms of 
affiliation to the firm (e.g. partners, customers and community edition users). As a whole, 
and particularly in the COSS context, community heterogeneity remains an under‐studied 
field that leaves much room for speculation. But the absence of certainty is no reason for 
managerial complacency or indifference. On the contrary, exactly because so little is known 
about underlying dynamics and possible ramifications of community heterogeneity, COSS 
companies are well advised to pay additional attention to it.  
Consequences of community mismanagement can be severe. If coordinated community 
constituencies lose trust or confidence in the commercial leadership, they can establish a 
pure open source project based on the community edition (fork). Not only does the firm 
thereby lose valuable parts of its voluntary work force, but the resulting publicity can have 
high reputational costs. Further, the forked project can turn into a fierce competitor. 
Therefore, in the words of Harhoff and Mayrhofer (ibid. p.142):  
While stable relationships can be attained, their management is likely to require constant 
attention. Firms will need to develop a comprehensive understanding of the community’s 
ecosystem; treating the collaboration as another form of business relationship is likely to lead to 
failure. 
With this in mind, we are now in the position to conclude the Theory chapter. 
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2.4.5 An integrated view 
As this chapter has established, OSS and COSS projects are complex socio‐technical 
ensembles, comprising a multitude of interdependent components or aspects, or, as it were, 
“interlocking cogwheels”. The ones most relevant to us are summarized in the figure below: 
 
Figure 1: Generic, mutually dependent components / aspects of (C)OSS projects. 
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Various scholars have studied the inner workings of OSS and COSS projects, and sought to 
establish the mutual significance of measurable technical, legal and managerial aspects (e.g. 
Stewart et.al. 2006; Stewart and Gosain, 2006; Capra and Francalanci et al.,2009). Yet, too 
few studies exist to confidently determine which findings and inferred theories of causality 
are applicable only to a particular setting, and which can be credibly extrapolated to the 
general. Since all OSS / FOSS projects display unique endogenous and exogenous 
particularities, caution is in order when performing deductive or inductive reasoning. Thus, 
even if generic patterns are readily recognizable across OSS / FOSS projects, one also needs 
to consider how archetypical templates are adopted to a specific setting, and perhaps even 
supplemented or customized with innovative new features. 
As we delve further into the problem domain of this thesis (chapter 4) and inquire into the 
three research questions (as posed in chapter 1), the reader should take notice of the 
methodological choice of grounded theory (presented in the following chapter), which 
guided the underlying research process. As this methodological approach inherently 
prescribes, the evolution of theory accompanies the ongoing process of analysis. For a 
consistent narrative, therefore, this is reflected through further introduction of theory in 
chapter 4. 
 
  
44 
3 Methods 
This thesis reports on findings from an exploratory case study on SugarCRM, guided by three 
predefined research questions (see chapter 1). The underlying research followed a grounded 
theory (GT) approach, in which theory evolved successively as collected data was interpreted 
(Glaser, 1978; Strauss and Corbin, 1998). As such, the overall process was inherently 
iterative, in accordance with what Glaser describes as the “sequential, subsequent, 
simultaneous, serendipitous, and scheduled” nature of GT (1998, p.15). Likewise, in line with 
Glaser’s famous “all is data” maxim (ibid, p.8), I kept an open mind with regards to 
potentially relevant data sources and data‐gathering techniques80. Based on conceptual 
understanding that emerged early in the process, it also appeared fruitful to lend 
terminology from Actor‐Network Theory (for the understanding and description of socio‐
technical semiotics), and theoretical perspectives from Phenomenology (for the 
interpretation of stakeholders’ subjective motivations and normative positions).  
Overall, the research process is summarized by the following figure: 
 
Figure 2: Simple schematic of the research process 
                                                     
80 E.g. the intended use of a questionnaire for a complementary quantitative analysis.  
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3.1 Data collection and analysis 
As is common for case studies, several data collection approaches were used for 
triangulation purposes (Maxwell, 1996; Creswell and Miller, 2000). Apart from 
epistemological considerations, the very nature of the problem domain guided the choosing 
of methodology: 
1. SugarCRM’s Community Manager had a tight schedule, and many questions would 
require some research from his side. Combined with the practical challenge of 
different time zones, this suggested an asynchronous mode of communication. 
2. Community members relate to SugarCRM through web forums and miscellaneous 
online points of contact (e.g. SugarForge*, developer blog81 and webinars). Being 
publicly available, they are suited for observation to obtain first‐hand knowledge. 
Likewise, a rich body of public commentary (e.g. press releases, forums and mailing 
lists) provided rich information, suitable for traditional hermeneutic interpretation.  
3. The community is made up of heterogeneous constituents, which are not practicably 
distinguishable through observation. And even though observations deliver 
circumstantial evidence on participants’ backgrounds and motivations, they cannot 
possibly provide a comprehensive understanding of subjective stakeholder 
perceptions. This suggested the use of an online questionnaire.  
4. There is a wide body of academic literature available on open source in general, and 
a somewhat narrower selection on commercial open source in particular. Combined 
with previous research on SugarCRM, this literature provides valuable access to 
relevant findings and scientific interpretations. 
Accordingly, four types of data sources / collection approaches were chosen as the basis for 
this thesis: (1) e‐mail interviews with the Community Manager, (2) observations, (3) an 
online questionnaire, and (4) review of literature. The iterative process of data collection 
from these sources, coding / conceptualization of findings, and the advancement of theory 
was supported by the use of mind maps (MindManager software) and different forms of 
Rich Picture Diagrams (pen and paper).  
                                                     
81 SugarCRM Developer Blog: http://developers.sugarcrm.com/wordpress/  
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3.1.1 E-mail interviews 
Multiple rounds of e‐mail interviews were conducted with SugarCRM’s Community Manager, 
John Mertic. As noted by Opdenakker (2006), this form of interviewing has its drawbacks82. 
Yet, as pointed out by various scholars (e.g. Bampton and Cowton, 2002; Kivits, 2005), it also 
has characteristic benefits: 
1. Significant savings in terms of required effort / increased feasibility: Asynchronous 
communication circumvents the challenge of finding mutually convenient times for 
time‐pressured participants, which can be particularly hard to overcome with 
different time zones. And as a bonus for the researcher: No transcription is required.  
2. Higher quality of information (Bampton and Cowton, 2002): “In permitting a lengthy 
delay between communications, an e‐interview gives the interviewee time to 
construct a response to a particular question. For example, it provides an opportunity 
to find information which might be required”, and “enables interviewees to reflect 
and then supply a considered reply”. Correspondingly, the approach can “reduce the 
pressure felt by nervous interviewees”. 
3. Access to more information: Interviewees not only get time to gather and validate 
information, but also to provide a wider range and depth of information. E‐mails are 
particularly suited for this, since they allow for attachments and hyperlink references.  
As these benefits were considered highly relevant in the context of this thesis, they became 
decisive for my choosing of the e‐mail approach.  
To assure reliability, I was careful not to formulate the interview questions in a leading or 
ambiguous manner. Even though every single set of questions could be considered as 
structured (i.e. in written form), I would argue that the overall interview process was semi‐
structured (as new questions were raised on the basis of previous answers).  
The focus of interviews changed over time: The first rounds were meant to clarify my 
general understanding of preliminary observations, and to establish the role of the 
Community Manager. Then, the focus turned towards community governance and implied 
                                                     
82 In short: (1) Lack of social cues; (2) low chance of spontaneous answers (which in some cases are considered 
valuable – but not in this case); (3) Risk that the interviewee may forget the “ongoing” interview (which can be 
counterweighted with reminders – but nevertheless poses a practical challenge). 
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strategy. As my understanding matured, later interview rounds then became more ad‐hoc in 
nature – based on accumulated questions that arose through my research. 
In a sense, the Community Manager also served as a gatekeeper to other valuable data: He 
provided me a dataset, and facilitated the use of the online questionnaire.  
3.1.2 Observation 
I performed two forms of observation, which in consecutive order were:   
• Exploratory: In order to form a preliminary understanding of the community and its 
modus operandi, I explored the web sites around which the community evolves: 
Forums, SugarForge, the Sugar Developer Zone, the Developer Blog etc. Based on 
these observations, I also looked at external web pages for a deeper understanding 
(e.g. early postings on vTiger forums – a SugarCRM fork). These observations, along 
with initial reviews of literature, served as an intermediate foundation for interviews 
and the online questionnaire. 
• Targeted: Based on other findings and emergent understanding thereof, I actively 
looked for information of relevance. For example, I sampled 20 random projects on 
SugarForge to determine the degree of collaboration among developers, and studied 
SugarCRM’s Trademark Policy to establish its relevance for strategic governance of 
the community edition (Sugar CE). 
Since the objects of observation varied in form and nature, I had to apply different practical 
methods to conclude on their meaning and mutual significance. While the overall approach 
was informally hermeneutic, I sometimes found it necessary to take on more rigorous 
methods. For example, observations led me into performing document analysis (e.g. for the 
supplementary terms of the AGPLv3 license, and the SugarCRM Trademark Policy).  
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3.1.3 Questionnaire  
In the absence of readily available data on SugarCRM’s community composition and 
participants’ motivations, I found an online questionnaire to be the best suitable approach. 
My initial aspiration was to perform multivariate analyses to discover covariance across a 
number of parameters, and collect qualitative data to guide the interpretation of 
observations. Regrettably, however, the questionnaire did not yield enough responses83 to 
provide adequate confidence through statistical significance. I had also hoped that the 
resulting dataset could be used for comparative purposes84, but this idea had to be 
abandoned for the same reason. Hence, the quantitative results of the questionnaire are not 
presented in this thesis.  
The design of the questionnaire was guided by results from preliminary reviews of literature, 
observations and interview rounds. As with the interviews, I was careful to avoid ambiguous 
or leading formulations, and consciously adapted the language to my audience. To capture 
qualitative data, I also used optional, open fields to allow respondents to elaborate or 
provide otherwise relevant information.  
The sample of respondents was naturally determined through self‐selection. With the help 
of the Community Manager, the questionnaire was announced in forums, newsletters, and 
most importantly: On SugarForge. Although all community constituents thereby should have 
been equally exposed to its presence, representativeness cannot thereby be guaranteed. In 
fact, the relative low number of respondents, accompanied by generally high scores on self‐
attributed contributions, may suggest that the most active community members were 
overrepresented. This could be explained both by a higher degree of attentiveness among 
active members85, and / or a correlated predisposition to participate. 
Although the questionnaire failed in its primary intent, it nevertheless produced valuable 
qualitative data which was used for triangulation purposes. And even if the resulting dataset 
is unsuited for statistical analysis, I found it useful enough for rudimentary testing against 
other scholars’ hypotheses.   
                                                     
83 62 full sets of replies were obtained by the beginning of September 2012, after the survey being prominently 
announced and marketed on SugarForge for about one month.  
84 The questions on motivation were purposely formulated so they would be compatible with datasets from 
other studies on open source community motivations.  
85 I.e. likelihood to read newsletter or visit the Web sites where the questionnaire was announced.  
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3.1.4 Review of literature 
Even before beginning with preliminary observations, I started off by reviewing relevant 
literature. The rationale behind this approach was to (1) build reflective knowledge86 on 
issues relating to the problem domain, (2) utilize this knowledge as a cognitive and 
conceptual foundation87 for the other applied methods, and (3) share this with the reader 
through an informed and consistent narrative88. As one might expect, my overall focus 
followed a trajectory from the general (open source software) towards the specific (e.g. 
business models and SugarCRM itself). Yet, as new understanding emerged around 
interpreted specifics (e.g. licensing schemes), I was constantly compelled to revisit and 
readjust my general understanding. As such, the body of reviewed literature provided 
valuable dialectic contributions to an ever revolving hermeneutic circle 89 . These 
contributions can be considered as both complementary and supplementary to those 
provided by observations, interviews and the questionnaire.  
The selection of literature was inherently guided by my research questions, along with 
corresponding search results from Google Scholar and suggestions made by my supervisors. 
Additionally, I actively looked for research that had not yet been published90, and even came 
across some by pure serendipity 91 . The amount of literature was not deliberately 
determined by choice, but naturally followed from the scope of the thesis and diminishing 
returns of additional research (saturation).  
As noted in the chapter on observation, I also performed document analyses and reviewed 
public commentaries (news articles, blogs, announcements etc.). In spite of methodological 
resemblance to literature review, these approaches were integral to exploratory observation 
efforts.  
 
                                                     
86 I.e., in terms of hermeneutics and phenomenology: The review of literature facilitates a preliminary “fusions 
of horizons” (Gadamer) – that is, to widen my hermeneutical horizon (contextual understanding). 
87 Following from the previous: To use my widened hermeneutical horizon as a basis for observation, interview‐ 
and questionnaire design, and thereafter for the hermeneutic interpretation of findings. 
88 Both in the form of a literature review (see Appendix B), and as dialectic components / reference points in 
the analysis of other literature, secondary data / interpretations and own findings (see Analysis chapter). 
89 Or, rather, a hermeneutic spiral (to avoid implications of infinite regress).  
90 By querying other scholars / authorities in the given field. 
91 E.g. Waltl et al. (2012), which I was given directly by the main author after discovering that he also was doing 
research on SugarCRM. 
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4 Analysis 
This chapter provides an analytical examination of collected data and reviewed literature 
(see chapter 3), based upon research questions presented in chapter 1 and theoretical 
framework of chapter 2. It starts with a general overview of SugarCRM to make the reader 
familiar with the object of inquiry, SugarCRM (Chapter 4.1). The two first research questions 
are then addressed in turn, and discussed in the light of my findings (Chapter 4.2 and 4.3, 
respectively). Building on this, the concluding remarks (Chapter 4.4) then also takes upon the 
last research question, which is more conceptual in nature and inherently follows from the 
two previous ones. Finally, a small subchapter (4.5) on future research concludes this thesis. 
4.1  SugarCRM – a general overview 
SugarCRM–a sweet mix of commercial and open source.92 
SugarCRM Inc. was founded in 2004, with 10 employees, charging $149 per user per year for 
support services to its open source customer relationship management (CRM) solution. The 
company was able to raise $8m within its first year of operation ($2m in 2004, and $6m in 
2005), and within 18 months its open source project had attracted a community large 
enough to support 21 different languages (Sterne and Herring, 2006). After successive 
rounds of funding and organic growth, the company turned cash flow positive in Q4 of 2010. 
In 2011 it proclaimed a new record, with a 92% year‐on‐year billings growth and annual 
revenue growth of 67%93.  In April of 2012 it announced94 it had completed a new $33m 
financing round (equity and debt) “for further expansion into the enterprise”. In terms of 
open source development, it now claims that “[m]ore than 30,000 registered developers in 
the Sugar community drive SugarCRM innovation through testing, feedback, extension 
creation, and complementary applications”95.  
                                                     
92 Title of Sterne and Herring, 2006 
93 Press Release (2012‐02‐22), SugarCRM Scores Another Banner Year in 2011, Retrieved Sept. 18, 2012 from 
http://www.sugarcrm.com/newspress/sugarcrm‐scores‐another‐banner‐year‐2011‐0 
Note: As the company is privately held, I wasn’t able to obtain numbers for net profit.  
94 Press Release (2012‐04‐04), SugarCRM completes $33 million financing round for further expansion into the 
enterprise. Retrieved Sept. 18, 2012 from http://www.sugarcrm.com/newspress/sugarcrm‐completes‐33‐
million‐financing‐round‐further‐expansion‐enterprise 
95 Official SugarCRM Community web page: http://www.sugarcrm.com/community. Retrieved Sept. 18, 2012. 
Note: Registered developers are a bad indicator for community vitality, as it does not say anything about actual 
activity of these developers. 
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4.1.1 Technical foundation 
SugarCRM builds on the LAMP solution stack – a widely used open source software bundle 
consisting of Linux (operating system), Apache (web server), MySQL (database management 
system) and PHP (server‐side scripting language). According to John Roberts96 (co‐founder 
and CEO until 2009), the choice of LAMP was based on a “conscious decision […] because we 
felt it was the least complex, most portable, and most cost‐efficient platform to run a CRM 
application on” (ibid). Likewise, as of version 4.5, SugarCRM integrates the open source YUI97 
JavaScript in its distributions. As such, SugarCRM should not only be recognized as a 
commercial open source project maintainer, but also as an OSS systems integrator and direct 
beneficiary of a wider open source ecosystem – not the least because of low barriers to 
entry and a familiar technological OSS environment for potential community members.  
4.1.2 Deployment 
SugarCRM allows for four different deployment and hosting options to customers: 
1. On‐premise: The customer uses own hardware and network resources, and deploys 
the software stack behind a firewall. This gives more control and flexibility for 
integration with legacy software, but raises costs for infrastructure, integration and 
maintenance. 
2. On‐demand, “SugarCRM cloud”: Hosed by SugarCRM based on a predefined Service 
Level Agreement (SLA), backup and secure FTP access. This Software as a Service 
(SaaS) option provides the inverse benefits and drawbacks as the above option. 
3. On‐demand, SugarCRM partners: Similar to the above option, but with a partner of 
SugarCRM. Terms and conditions may vary between providers.  
4. Public Cloud: This is a compromise between the first and two latter options. The 
SugarCRM stack can be deployed on public (commercial) clouds, such as Amazon 
Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2), Windows Azure, Rackspace Cloud or IBM SmartCloud. 
Users of the Sugar Community Edition (CE) are likely to fall into the on‐premise category. 
                                                     
96 It was named “Project of the Month” on SourceForge in October 2004, see 
http://sourceforge.net/potm/potm‐2004‐10.php 
97 Yahoo! User Interface Library, which uses the BSD (permissive) license.  
52 
4.1.3 SugarCRM’s legal framework 
The legal framework of SugarCRM is quite typical for that of COSS firms (see chapter 2.4.1). 
Yet, in some respects, the company has broken the mold, with new innovative ways to 
license its open source version – the Sugar Community Edition (CE)98. Although other COSS 
firms have followed its example, SugarCRM has gained particular attention for its lead role. 
4.1.3.1 Exploring troubled waters 
SugarCRM pioneered the controversial “Exhibit B” clause, later imitated by other COSS 
companies. It entails a potent modification of the Mozilla Public License 1.1 (MPL 1.1), which 
requires all derivate work to conspicuously display a specified logo in all interactive user 
interfaces99. While proponents defend this as a measure to assure attribution to original 
authors100, opponents denote it as a “badgeware” clause that is in clear breach of 
fundamental FOSS principles. Apparently, so the latter camp argues, the primary rationale 
behind this provision is not attribution, but to advertise for the commercial product, prevent 
forking and inhibit external reuse of code. As a result, SugarCRM received considerable 
critique and bad publicity for claiming to be open source, while its altered MPL license had 
not even been approved by the OSI101:  
“it is the first time we have [..] to confront agents who fly our flag as their actions serve to 
corrupt our movement. The time has come to bring the matter into the open, and to let the 
democratic light of the open source community illuminate for all of us the proper answer.”  
Thus, SugarCRM was hailed as a hero when, in 2007, it announced the release of the 
Community Edition 5.0 under the GPLv3102:  
SugarCRM has shot right past the badgeware debate by embracing GPL V3. This updated version 
of the GPL has been portrayed by open source rivals as a threat against business – gwana, 
gwana, gwana. Now, we find a leading software maker going whole hog with the license. 
                                                     
98 Previously known as Sugar Open Source. 
99 In this case saying “Powered by SugarCRM”, with a hyperlink to the company’s website.  
100 Note: The “Software as a Service” (SaaS) delivery model allows hosted software to be commercially used 
without offering access to the underlying code ‐ the so‐called SaaS “loophole”, also known as the application 
service provider (ASP) loophole.  The “Exhibit B” clause closes this loophole.  
101 E.g. Michael Tiemann (2007‐06‐21), Will The Real Open Source CRM Please Stand Up? Retrieved Sept. 18, 
2012 from the blog of Michael Tiemann (then president of the OSI): http://opensource.org/node/163  
102 Ashlee Vance (2007‐07‐25), SugarCRM trades badgeware for GPL 3: A hero is born. Retrieved Sept. 18, 2012 
from http://www.theregister.co.uk/2007/07/25/sugarcrm_gpl3/ 
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But the euphoria soon settled, as it became clear that SugarCRM had merely translated its 
“Exhibit B” clause into a different legal shape. As one disgruntled contributor to a mailing list 
noted to general acclamation103:  
I personally consider most licence requirements for 'visual display of OSS attributions' to be at 
minimum a bit obnoxious […]. SugarCRM's subsequent torturing of GPLv3 into a particularly bad 
badgeware licence through stitching their earlier badgeware requirement into GPLv3 via a hook 
in GPLv3 section 7 -- covering SugarCRM Community Edition 5.0 -- was IMO outright deceptive, 
particularly the way they ballyhooed that move in public pronouncements, implying they were 
using stock GPLv3 when that was not the case […]. 
After outcries of foul play, the company in 2010 moved on to the AGPLv3 license104 with 
SugarCRM CE 6.0. But the new version stirred up just as much controversy, albeit for a 
different reason: New major features (notably the user interface) were withheld from the 
Community Edition, thereby widening the functionality gap to commercial editions105. Now 
SugarCRM was accused of flirting with the newly termed “open core” business model106, 
which had received extensive negative attention among FOSS supporters. SugarCRM refuted 
the accusations, pointing out that all (even commercial) editions contain the entire source 
code107, and stated that “[o]pen source doesn't mean free and was never really meant to 
mean free”108. Although indisputably correct, this argument somewhat misses the point by 
ignoring key aspects of the Open Source Definition – the rights to modify the relevant code 
and distribute derivative work. Thus, the enduring disagreement seems to circle around the 
very definition and use of the term “open source”. According to an anonymous blog 
comment109: 
                                                     
103 Rick Moen (2012‐02‐01), message to the License‐discuss mailing list (with minor corrections),  Retrieved 
Sept. 18, 2012 from http://projects.opensource.org/pipermail/license‐discuss/2012‐February/000180.html 
104 The AGPL (Affero GPL) license is specifically designed to fill the above mentioned SaaS / ASP loophole.  
105 The move also spurred rumors among community members that SugarCRM would put less effort in the CE 
edition, or indeed be orphan it. See http://forums.sugarcrm.com/f22/sugarcrm‐ce‐being‐left‐out‐loop‐65740/ 
106 “Open core” is a relatively new and ambiguous term. As often used, it only subtly differs from (or is a subset 
of) a COSS / dual licensing model. It puts more emphasis on a feature limited “basic” open source version 
(strongly implying “crippleware”) with optional additional commercial features.  
107 Note: The source code of SugarCRM is written in PHP – an interpreted language that is inherently unsuited 
for compilation into binary code (although some recent PHP compilers have had limited success).  
108 Martin Schneider, senior director of communications at SugarCRM, cited from InternetNews.com in article 
by S.M. Kerner (2010‐07‐13), SugarCRM 6 Debuts with Open Source and Commercial Features, retrieved Sept. 
22, 2012 from http://www.enterpriseappstoday.com/article.php/3892731 
109 Comment to article by S. Dean (2010‐07‐14), Has SugarCRM Violated Open Source Principles? Retrieved 
Sept. 22, 2012 from http://ostatic.com/blog/has‐sugarcrm‐violated‐open‐source‐principles 
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As far as I can tell, the complaints are not about SugarCRM's business strategy or distribution 
terms, but only around their insistence on using the term "open source" to describe what they're 
doing. That's what the controversy is about: the dilution of a term with a very specific and well-
understood meaning. How SugarCRM generates their revenue is not at issue. Accuracy in 
labeling is. 
In this context, the OSI’s formal criteria of “open source” licenses – which Sugar CE appears 
to satisfy – seem secondary to normative perceptions of what they should entail. In an 
interview110 on the occasion of the official 10th anniversary of the OSS movement, Bruce 
Perens111 expressed regret of only one thing: That the OSI’s license ratification process had 
not been implemented with clearer guidelines. According to him, the proliferation in OSI‐
approved licenses, and particularly the emergence of attribution (“badgeware”) licenses, is 
“dangerous” and puts open source on a “slippery slope”. Already before SugarCRM migrated 
to the GPL, he is to have said “that the minute a license becomes so prescriptive about what 
developers can and cannot do with a software's user interface, it's no longer open source 
because of how one of open source's most fundamental tenets is the developers' freedom 
to control the user interface”112. Similarly, Eben Moglen, general counsel to the FSF, “agreed 
with other critics that the requirements limit developer freedom and that developer 
freedom is one of the things that free software is all about” (loc. cit). Apparently, they are 
not alone in such thinking. Some FOSS pundits are already exploring new legal instruments 
to counter what they consider commercially compromised licenses 113 . Meanwhile, 
SugarCRM stands its ground and remains in the limelight of critics.  
  
                                                     
110 G. Clarke (2008‐02‐11), Perens: 'Badgeware' threat to open source's next decade. Retrieved Sept. 22, 2012 
from http://www.theregister.co.uk/2008/02/11/open_source_at_ten/ 
111 Author of the Open Source Definition and co‐founder of the OSI 
112 David Berlind (2006‐12‐06), Podcast: SugarCRM CEO says attribution in open source licenses is about 
fairness, Retrieved Sept. 22, 2012 from http://www.zdnet.com/blog/berlind/podcast‐sugarcrm‐ceo‐says‐
attribution‐in‐open‐source‐licenses‐is‐about‐fairness/211  
113 E.g. “GPL.next” a fork of GPLv3 initiated by Richard Fontana (co‐author of the original GPLv3). 
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4.1.3.2 IP modularity 
A recent study (Waltl, Henkel, et al., 2012, p.95) confirms that SugarCRM faces “conflicting 
goals of openness toward users and complement developers for the purpose of distributed 
value creation, and of maintaining exclusivity of essential modules in order to appropriate 
value”. IP modularity is therefore of “highest strategic relevance for SugarCRM and its 
ecosystem”. In the words of Clint Oram, co‐founder and CTO of the firm (loc. cit.): 
I would say it’s one the most fundamental aspects of our entire business model strategy that we 
purposely keep the modularity in such a way that we can easily create different [open source 
and proprietary] editions. What we sell is based on IP modularity. 
Not surprisingly then, the study finds that the platform architecture and business model are 
inherently interrelated: “The business model is enabled by a product architecture that 
separates the IP elements for the community edition from the elements required for the 
commercial editions” (ibid. pp. 98‐99)114. SugarCRM’s basic product architecture is depicted 
in a simplified schematic as follows115:  
Figure 3: Schematic Architecture Overview for SugarCRM 
Interestingly, the figure implies code IP heterogeneity even for the platform core. SugarCRM 
has indeed some core components exclusively dedicated for proprietary distributions. This 
increases complexity and may pose a risk of code incompatibility. SugarCRM ensures 
compatibility by using the same code tree for all distributions, and through the build process 
                                                     
114 Note: Commercial editions are governed by the , SugarCRM Master Subscription Agreement. See 
http://www.sugarcrm.com/master‐subscription‐agreement 
115 Fig. 1 in ibid. p. 99: Schematic Architecture Overview 
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segregating the code according to preset tags. And while such granular IP modularity rises 
development costs, it is justified by an increased “strategic control of value appropriation” 
(ibid p. 104).  The community is not included in this process. It has access to the Sugar CE 
code116, but almost exclusively works on optional extension modules, language packs and 
themes. The legal terms for these peripheral components may vary, depending on what the 
authors choose117. To the limited degree that community members actually contribute to 
core functionality (mostly bug fixes), they are first required to sign the SugarCRM 
Contributor Agreement118. This leads us to the subject of project governance. 
  
                                                     
116 Hosted on GitHub: https://github.com/sugarcrm/sugarcrm_dev 
117 According to John Mertic, Community Manager at SugarCRM 
118 Which states that “You assign all right, title and interest worldwide in all patents, inventions copyrights and 
related moral rights ("IP Rights") for the full term of their existence in and to Your Contributions to SugarCRM” 
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4.1.4 Governance 
The SugarCRM community is governed as a commercial “benevolent dictatorship”, wherein 
the corporate sponsor wields exclusive control over the code base, the project’s evolution 
strategy, and the implementation roadmap. Since the community in essence is relegated to 
peripheral extension modules, it does not naturally evolve around a shared code base (the 
platform core), as is the case in conventional OSS projects119. On the contrary, the SugarCRM 
community appears to be a fragmented cluster of entities, held together by the gravitational 
pull of web forums120 and a distribution platform for complementary software modules 
(SugarForge*121). Many modules found here cannot be considered as open source, since 
authors may share them under proprietary terms122. Moreover, there is little evidence to 
suggest that collaborative development on these peripherals is the norm. Even if registered 
SugarForge members may “request to join” projects of others, all sampled projects were 
provided by only one single entity (mostly commercial). As such, the SugerCRM community 
does not seem to engage in Bazaar style collaborative development – a guiding principle of 
OSS.  
To reward and incentivize partners who engage in the community, SugarCRM in late 2010 
started its “Open+ Developer Program”. As members, they can “gain access to emerging 
SugarCRM features and the ability to provide feedback earlier in the development cycle”123. 
Although the role of corporate participation in COSS projects is “a consolidated and 
generally accepted fact” (Capra, Francalanci, et al.: 2009, p.225), this move is emblematic of 
a strictly controlled development process that evidently tilts in favor of commercial 
                                                     
119 As of August 2012, about two thirds into the year, SugarCRM had registered less than 80 code contributions 
for the platform core (including bug fixes) – which was hailed as nearly the double rate from the previous year. 
An overwhelming majority of these contributions were made by commercial partners (or employees thereof). 
See SugarCRM Developer Blog (2012‐08‐10), Calling out some top contributors in the community, Retrieved 
Sept. 28, 2012 from http://developers.sugarcrm.com/wordpress/2012/08/10/calling‐out‐some‐top‐
contributors‐in‐the‐community/ 
120 See http://forums.sugarcrm.com/. Help forums attract most activity.  
121 SugarForge (http://www.sugarforge.org/) serves as SugarCRM’s community portal, where optional 
extension modules (i.e. complementaries such as language packs, skins and add‐ons) are shared (for both Sugar 
CE and commercial editions). Also see Appendix A. Although marketed as a “factory”, there is little evidence of 
collaborative work on SugarForge. 
122 See Terms & Conditions (“SugarCRM On‐Line Terms Of Use”) required to be approved for registration on 
SugarForge: http://www.sugarcrm.com/page/sugarcrm‐line‐terms‐use/en . Of the sampled projects 20% (2) 
explicitly stated to be of “Other / Proprietary” nature. 
123 Poer, M. (2011‐07‐11),  Profiling Solutions joins SugarCRM Open+ Developer Program, Retrieved Sept. 28, 
2012 from http://www.profilingsolutions.com/archive/profiling‐solutions‐joins‐sugarcrm‐open‐developer‐
program/ 
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affiliation. Governance thus gets condensed to a series of entrenched institutionalized 
sluices, over which independent community members have little real influence. This 
observation is substantiated by the already mentioned study by Capra and Wasserman 
(2008), which identifies SugarCRM as the only “fully closed” project when measured against 
all the four “fundamental governance dimensions”124. See figure:125 
 
Figure 4: Visualization of comparative assessment of four COSS projects’ governance model 
As the study concludes (ibid. p.12, my emphasis): “SugarCRM governance and managerial 
styles are actually very similar to those of a traditional closed software project, with the only 
exceptions that most of the code is open and that external people can contribute code”. 
Naturally, such observations provide ammunition to critics who already question 
SugarCRM’s open source credentials. This does not make Sugar CE less OSI‐compliant in 
formal terms. But it may create false expectations among those that share a more 
conventional understanding of the term “open source”, thus spurring mistrust and notions 
of unfairness. 
                                                     
124 I.e. as stated in chapter 2.4.4: (1) Contribution (relative amount of voluntary code development), (2) Project 
leadership (distributed vs. hierarchical decision making), (3) working practices (geographically distributed and 
virtual communication vs. physical proximity and face‐to‐face interaction), and (4) testing (community peer‐
review vs. formalized “in‐house” quality assurance of code contributions – i.e. a powerful gatekeeper role). My 
observations and interviews confirm that these findings are still valid. 
125 Figure 2 in ibid: Graphical representation of the assessment of a project according to the framework. 
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4.2 Stakeholders and their incentives for participation 
The parties involved in the development of SugarCRM software fall into one or several of 
four main categories: 
1. SugarCRM employees: These are hired software developers whose primary focus is 
on the AGPLv3‐lincensed platform core and proprietary modules for the commercial 
product range. SugarCRM employees are also encouraged to participate in 
community forums, where they mainly answer technical questions. Naturally, this 
category directly involves the CTO126 and community manager127, and by implication 
also shareholders and the remaining C‐suite. 
2. Affiliates: SugarCRM has several standardized partner programs128. Many companies 
also have an implicit affiliation with SugarCRM129 and use SugarForge to distribute 
extension modules. According to the Community Manager, many companies “start in 
the SugarForge community, and as their practice grows and matures they will look to 
be part of the Partner programs” (which also give access to SugarExchange*). This 
category is dominated by VARs and ISVs that provide complementary functionality. 
3. Customers: Customers of SugarCRM and its affiliates (e.g. resellers) play a more 
peripheral role in the development process. But particularly in the case of On‐
premise deployment, customers need to relate to SugarCRM code for integration and 
customization. They are well represented in forums, where they post questions and 
receive guidance. A special case is IBM, to which SugarCRM also relates through a 
global partnership program. 
4. Sugar CE users: The open source edition is downloaded by both individuals and 
institutions (SMEs, start‐ups and non‐profits), many of which later become paying 
customers in order to get access to more advanced features (e.g. team management 
and mobile support). Sugar CE users make use of extension modules from 
SugarForge, and occasionally contribute own modules.  
                                                     
126 Clint Oram (CTO and co‐founder), who leads product strategy and product management. 
127 John Mertic (Community Manager since 2011), who is an authority on PHP and open source CRM. He 
coordinates external contributions with internal development and represents SugarCRM at OSS conferences.  
128 See Appendix E.  
129 E.g. third party software providers, who integrate their software with SugarCRM.  
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Members of all stakeholder categories are well represented in community forums. Beyond 
that, participation focus in the development varies (see Table 2): 
 SugarCRM employees Affiliates Customers Sugar CE users 
Predominant work ethic / 
incentive to contribute Salary‐based Salary‐based Salary‐based 
Mixed salary based 
and voluntary 
Primary contributions to 
the development process 
Platform core, 
proprietary module 
extensions, bug r.+f. 
Proprietary and OSS 
module extensions. 
Bug r.+f. 
Bug r. Bug r.+f., OSS extensions 
Table 2: Stakeholders incentives and development focus (r = reporting, f = fixing). 
The survey results clearly identified “need / wish for software improvements” as the overall 
principal reason for contributing. Other dominating motivational factors are “the widespread 
use of the software”130 and “attractiveness of the software itself”. Interestingly, individuals 
who are also active in other open source projects131 rank the motivational factors differently 
for their general participation in OSS projects than they do for their SugarCRM 
participation132. Here, and particularly amongst those who use Sugar CE personally133, 
motivational factors associated with hacker culture play a somewhat larger role134. This 
highlights a distinction between dispositional and contextual motivation – i.e. the same 
individual with given motivational dispositions may “play out” different forms of motivation 
in different contexts (Oreg and Nov, 2008). Or seen from a different perspective: An 
unfavorable context may dampen enjoyment‐driven enthusiasm (Stewart and Gosain 2006). 
Both interpretations seem plausible in the case of SugarCRM. 
Overall, we can conclude that the stakeholders’ incentives of cooperation in the SugarCRM 
development process are of an utilitarian, commercially‐oriented nature. Even among a 
minority of purely voluntary contributors135 motivational factors are clearly tilted towards 
the utility spectrum. This substantiates qualitative findings by Shah (2006), which predict 
such a trend for gated OSS communities.  
                                                     
130 A proxy for networks effects based on community‐ and user pool size (i.e. factors that increase the value of 
complements and indicate the overall health of the project).  
131Among those that also participate in other OSS projects (57% of all respondents), Sugar CE users are clearly  
overrepresented.  
132 I.e. including OSS projects besides SugarCRM.  
133 Note: About half of those using Sugar CE personally are also employed by SugarCRM, one of its affiliates, 
customers and / or an institutions using Sugar CE. 
134 Fun, commitment to the community, reciprocity, meet like‐minded people and community spirit. 
135 I.e. those not receiving pecuniary rewards for contributions.  
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4.3  Strategies 
SugarCRM employs a number of strategies to safeguard shareholder interests. This 
subchapter explores how these align with the needs of other stakeholders within the COSS 
ecosystem. It starts off with SugarCRM’s overarching market orientation, which becomes 
defining for the relative strategic relevance of different community constituencies. Second, it 
turns to a number of seemingly unproblematic measures and technological enhancers that 
SugarCRM employs to spur innovation, increase productivity and rouse a shared community 
spirit. This includes ancillary tools and platforms, which empower all parties in the 
development process. Finally, it revisits the legal framework of SugarCRM, before it closes 
with a discussion of general implications. 
4.3.1 Market and sales orientation by proxy 
Larry Augustin136, CEO of SugarCRM since 2009, believes that “SugarCRM's product is a 
process sale, not a technology sale”.137 This has lent value‐added resellers (VARs) an 
increasingly strategic role. “The traditional theory”, so it goes, is that the open source model 
bypasses VARs “since customers are able to download and try out free software directly; if 
they require support or customisation, they would contact the software company directly” 
(loc. cit.). But SugarCRM cannot possibly satisfy heterogeneous demands from diverse 
vertical markets simultaneously (Brownstein et. al., 2006). VARs, on the other hand, have 
intimate knowledge of their market segments. And as SugarCRM source code is readily 
available to them, they stand in an ideal position to offer tailored support, customizations 
and “narrow” complementary functionality. The comprehension of this fact probably 
contributed to the establishment of the mentioned SugarCRM Open+ Developer Program138, 
“to provide more collaboration and a tighter feedback loop with customers and the Sugar 
business partner community that writes add‐ons”139. On a nonspecific “getting started” page 
for community developers, the program is advertised specifically to partner employees140:  
                                                     
136 Larry Augustin is also known as one of the contributing theorists behind the Open Source movement, prolific 
OSS entrepreneur and venture capitalist.  
137 Moody, G. (2010‐10‐10), (Finally) Meeting Mr. Open Source Business, Blog entry retrieved Oct. 10, 2012 
from http://blogs.computerworlduk.com/open‐enterprise/2010/10/finally‐meeting‐mr‐open‐source‐business/ 
138 See http://www.sugarcrm.com/partner/sugarcrm‐open‐partner‐program. The page states that “As a 
channel focused company, SugarCRM is 100% committed to our partner's success”. Retrieved Oct. 10, 2012. 
139 Woody, A. (2011‐11‐08), SugarCRM Bolsters Development, Admin Features with Version 6.3,  Retrieved Oct. 
10, 2012 from http://www.itjungle.com/fhs/fhs110811‐printer09.html 
140 Retrieved Oct. 10, 2012 from http://support.sugarcrm.com/01_Get_Started/03_Developers/03_Community 
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If you work for a partner of SugarCRM, then we highly encourage you to consider becoming part 
of the Open+ program. Being an Open+ developer gives you the inside track on upcoming 
features and designs for Sugar with the added benefit of allowing you to contribute to the 
success of the product. In addition, you will engage with the SugarCRM engineering team to help 
guide you on complex customizations and integrations that you deliver for your customers. 
Apparently, SugarCRM  goes a long way to align itself with the needs of its partners and 
customers, and reserves an exclusive position to its affiliates in the developer community. In 
the same spirit, it holds annual conferences (SugarCon), specifically targeted at employees of 
partners and third party affiliates141. Any corresponding push to accommodate voluntary 
contributors could not be observed. Of course, most of the Open+ program’s offerings would 
not be suitable to Sugar CE developers – nor would the annual conferences, since they are 
primarily relevant for commercial editions. And it seems nothing but reasonable, from a 
commercial perspective, that SugarCRM prioritizes its revenue generating editions and sales 
channels over Sugar CE. Further, one can plausibly argue that the community edition directly 
benefits from the commercial ones, as the improvement of the latter also relate to the 
shared platform core and common basic modules142. Nevertheless, even if there is no official 
segmentation of the community, the sum of preferential affiliate initiatives amount to a de 
facto layering of it. In ANT terminology, they constitute a powerful translation of 
commercially guided interests into organizational inscriptions, which in turn influence the 
nature of the community. Whether this amounts to a conscious strategy to steer the 
community towards commercial hegemony or homogeneity could not be empirically 
established. But it can be assumed that independent volunteers may perceive this as 
procedural and / or distributional unfairness (see chapter 2.4.4)143.  
The pertinent question is whether SugarCRM would have anything to gain from diminishing 
the role of its voluntary CE contributors. The company benefits from a sizable CE 
constituency to uphold its open source credentials, but its relative size may not be important 
in this regard. Then there is the implicit danger of OSS forks deriving from independent 
                                                     
141 In 2012 held at the Waldorf Astoria, New York, with an agenda that “provides strategic and practical insight 
on how to engage your entire business to effectively and consistently interact with your customers.” Retrieved 
Oct. 11, 2012 from http://sugarcon.sugarcrm.com/ (under “about” tab). 
142 According to the Community Manager (interview), the “top end Ultimate edition has around 80% code 
commonality with the CE edition”. 
143 Note: In this context, it is not as much a question of differentiation, as it is of subjective perceptions of a 
viable and fair balance between volunteers and commercially employed developers. 
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community members, which one may construe as less likely if the ranks of volunteers 
dwindle. This is an intriguing line of thought, but again, neither possible to confirm nor 
disprove as an actual managerial doctrine. Above all: Keeping an independent Sugar CE 
community constituency alive and well seems intuitively rational, since it represents a 
valuable business asset. Yet the seeming shortage of unambiguous measures to reaffirm 
SugarCRM’s commitment to CE developers is bound to raise questions. One appropriate 
measure could be a formalized “covenant” in exchange of copyright attribution (as Perens 
suggests, see chapter 2.4.4). Another to allow the community more influence or slack in the 
governance of the Sugar CE (see chapter 4.1.4). 
4.3.2 Win-win 
Preferential treatment aside, SugarCRM also has a palette of offerings that are accessible to 
the wider community ecosystem. For example, it holds regular “code sprints”, to which CE 
community may also get invited144.  These appear to be popular happenings, which not only 
provide developers an opportunity to meet like‐minded peers face‐to‐face and take on 
stimulating challenges, but also spur innovative enhancements that benefit SugarCRM, 
partners and users145. Another noticeable initiative is the so‐called “Project of the Month" 
(POTM)146, similar to that of SourceForge. It allows registered SugarForge developers to 
nominate candidates and vote for “the most outstanding and innovative add‐ons, plugins, 
and extensions”. This is likely to foster peer recognition, which scholars link to motivational 
factors like ego gratification, self‐marketing and community identification (Hars and 
Shaosong, 2001; Lerner and Tirole, 2005).  
To empower the development process, SugarCRM offers and promotes a number of 
technical enhancers. Besides the provision of online documentation, hosting of code147, 
discussion forums, a bug tracker148 and generic tools (e.g. PHPUnit for unit testing), it also 
offers tools that are custom made for SugarCRM development149:  
                                                     
144 John Mertic (2012‐03‐02), Code sprinting in Raleigh = success, SugarCRM Developer blog entry, retrieved 
Oct. 11, 2012 from http://developers.sugarcrm.com/wordpress/2012/03/02/code‐sprinting‐in‐raleigh‐success/ 
145 Sonja Fridell (2012‐01‐23), SugarCRM Code Sprint, An Engineer’s Point of View, Retrieved Oct. 11, 2012 from  
http://www.brainsell.net/blog/2012/01/sugarcrm‐code‐sprint‐an‐engineers‐point‐of‐view/ 
146 See http://www.sugarforge.org/content/project‐of‐the‐month/  
147 GitHub for the CE core, and SugarForge for modular community extensions 
148 See http://www.sugarcrm.com/support/bugs.html 
149 Other tools, like MeterMaid and SugarMMM, have been discontinued according to the Community Manager 
(interview), but are still advertised in the Sugar Developer Zone as of early October 2012.  
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• SODA and SodaMachine for functional testing 
• TidBit to generate large amounts of data for scalability and performance testing  
Although many regard these offerings as adequate, some survey respondents like to point 
out specific issues that leave room for improvement – the use of Git for modular extensions 
being the most recurring issue, e.g. 150(minor typographic and grammatical corrections):  
Git availability on SugarForge is something that I've been expecting for a long time, it would 
definitely ease the process of project submission. And considering it also being used by Sugar to 
manage the core product and that it's the most used version control system nowadays, I believe 
it would make sense. Exploring the possibility of "hosting" remote projects (github, google code, 
etc) would also avoid people having the same project on two different places.  
Other issues concern a lack of proper documentation of “internals”, the professed absence 
of a quality control scheme, more advanced search functionality, a way to easily test 
modules prior to installation, the archiving of outdated / unsupported modules151, and a 
more intuitive organization of modular extensions. Given the importance of satisfactory 
developer toolkits (see chapter 2.3.4), SugarCRM is well advised to consider options that 
address these professed shortcomings. 
There are some noticeable outliers who used the opportunity to voice blatant criticism of, 
for example, SugarForge in general (“abandoned site!”152) and the Community Manager 
(should do “some work instead of plugging the commercial editions”153). Even if overly 
tendentious and unjustified, such strong negative sentiments raise concerns over potentially 
wider discontent among Sugar CE developers. Unfortunately, the survey did not include any 
questions to explore this issue in further detail. Regardless, SugarCRM could benefit from 
commissioning an authoritative unpartisan third‐party assessment to dispel misgivings and 
identify potential measures to overcome underlying causes. Along the same lines, a census 
could establish the actual number of active developers154 within the different community 
constituencies. If the results were encouraging, they could then be used by SugarCRM to 
parade a harmonious relationship with a vibrant community.  
                                                     
150 Respondent ID: 3389715 (from Portugal, partner employee and personal user of the Sugar CE). 
151 Which my observations confirm to represent a large share of SugarForge extensions. 
152 Respondent ID: 3424602 (from Costa Rica, employed by institution using Sugar CE, and also personal user of 
Sugar CE). 
153 Respondent ID: 3390324 (from Chile, personal user of the Sugar CE). 
154 In contrast to all registered developers on SugarForge, the number of which is used for marketing purposes. 
65 
4.3.3 Legal assurances  
SugarCRM employs the AGPLv3155 license for its CE edition. In legal terms, Sugar CE can thus 
be considered as free software156. Yet, as earlier explained, the firm’s consolidated copyright 
ownership allows it to reemploy the same code under commercial terms. Through a 
deliberate IP‐modular product architecture SugarCRM thus achieves strategic product 
differentiation and price discrimination. Meanwhile, the AGPL license effectively deters 
commercial competitors from reusing code from the Sugar CE. Interestingly, though, 
SugarCRM does not appear to consider the generic AGPL terms as sufficient – it apparently 
found it necessary to apply far‐reaching augmentations to safeguard its commercial interests 
(see Appendix D). Of these, one deserves particular attention – the requirement of user 
interfaces of derivate work to display the “Powered by SugarCRM” logo as part of 
“Appropriate Legal Notices”: 
The interactive user interfaces in modified source and object code versions of this program must 
display Appropriate Legal Notices, as required under Section 5 of the GNU Affero General Public 
License version 3.  
In accordance with Section 7(b) of the GNU Affero General Public License version 3, these 
Appropriate Legal Notices must retain the display of the "Powered by SugarCRM" logo. If the 
display of the logo is not reasonably feasible for technical reasons, the Appropriate Legal Notices 
must display the words "Powered by SugarCRM".  
This corresponds with “attribution” provisions from earlier versions (see chapter 4.1.3.1), 
and remains equally controversial today157. As one contributor to the legal-debian mailing 
list puts it158: 
I think this goes beyond (A)GPLv3 §7(b): "Powered by SugarCRM" is neither an Appropriate Legal 
Notice (defined in the AGPLv3 as a copyright notice, statement of no warranty, or statement 
that it's under the AGPLv3) nor an author attribution (author attributions look like this: "based 
on software written by John Doe, Jane Smith and FooCorp, Inc."). It's also not necessarily true, or 
advantageous to the authors of SugarCRM. If I extracted a module from SugarCRM to use in my 
new webapp, it looks as though the authors of SugarCRM are trying to require me to say 
                                                     
155 The GNU Affero General Public License, version 3. See http://www.gnu.org/licenses/agpl‐3.0.html  
156 As additional terms explicitly state: “This program is free software” (see Appendix D).  
157 Making Sugar CE to fit into the category of what is popularly known as “badgeware”.  
158 Simon McVittie (2011‐12‐14), Subject: Re: Thoughts on GPL's Appropriate Legal Notices? or the CPAL? 
Retrieved Oct. 14, 2012 from http://lists.debian.org/debian‐legal/2011/12/msg00034.html 
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"Powered by SugarCRM" - even if the rest of my webapp is so bad that doing so could damage 
SugarCRM's reputation! (By contrast, "incorporates code from SugarCRM" would remain a true 
fact, and is nicely neutral: a non-binding request to acknowledge use of SugarCRM is much less 
adversarial and probably has about the same practical effect.) 
Reasonably enough, this argument recognizes a potentially detrimental boomerang effect. 
But it also implies a likely dissuading effect on partial or wholesale (fork) reuse of code, since 
a mandatory “Powered by SugarCRM” logo (henceforth The Logo) on “interactive user 
interfaces”159 could deteriorate the appeal of any resulting software. Apart from branding, 
the prevention of external code reuse is therefore a probable rationale behind the scheme. 
This seems all the more likely if we consider the relevance of SugarCRM’s Trademark Policy 
(TP) 160: Among several “SugarCRM Marks”, it identifies The Logo as the “SugarCRM 
Conditional Use Logo”, and explicitly threatens with legal action for unauthorized or 
“detrimental” use. As such, it actually preempts the above noted detrimental boomerang 
effects. But it also poses a catch‐22‐like paradox with Kafkaesque connotations to would‐be 
adopters of Sugar CE code: 
• Premise 1, axiom: Sugar CE is licensed under the AGPLv3, which is “intended to guarantee 
your freedom to share and change” any code that is governed by it. 
• Premise 2: The use of The Logo is mandated by SugarCRM additional terms, in professed 
accordance with “Appropriate Legal Notices” of the AGPLv3 (Section 5 and 7b). 
• Premise 3 (TP, Section 1A): Under certain conditions, The Logo may be “used without specific 
written permission from SugarCRM”. Amongst others, these conditions prohibit 
“detrimental” use, and require compliancy with Section 2 of the TP. But “SugarCRM reserves 
the right to revoke this authorization at any time in its sole discretion for any reason” – for 
example, if SugarCRM deems the use as detrimental. 
• Premise 4 (TP, Section 2A): “Unauthorized use of the SugarCRM Marks or marks that are 
confusingly similar thereto constitutes an infringement of SugarCRM's trademark rights and 
is strictly prohibited”. 
• Paradoxical conclusion: The “freedoms” that the AGPLv3 is supposed to guarantee do not 
appear to apply to Sugar CE – although it actually is governed by the AGPLv3.  
                                                     
159 Which in effect refers to all interfaces of the software, since CRM systems are throughout interactive.  
160 See http://www.sugarcrm.com/about/trademark‐information (Last modified: 24 February 2012). Retrieved 
Oct. 14, 2012 
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Since the use of The Logo is required, but its use simultaneously rests on authorization, a 
discretional revocation of authorization could effectively render an entire derived software 
distribution useless. Further, the TP (Section 1A) threatens with intimidating reprimands: 
Upon revocation of this authorization by SugarCRM, you shall immediately cease using any and 
all SugarCRM "Conditional Use" Logo [sic]. If you do not immediately cease using all SugarCRM 
"Conditional Use" Logos upon revocation [..], SugarCRM may take whatever action it deems 
necessary to protect its rights and interests, including but not limited to seeking injunctive relief, 
actual damages, disgorgement of profits, trebling of any monetary award and attorneys’ fees. 
Unsurprisingly, SugarCRM has experienced few forking attempts after it first introduced such 
a scheme into its legal framework. Interestingly, it was “compelled” to take this step in late 
2004161, shortly after vTiger CRM appeared as a SugarCRM fork162. The fork was instigated 
under a confrontational “honest open source” banner, just as SugarCRM was starting to 
“close” some of its source code for commercial gain (Rossi, 2011). A short but fierce verbal 
clash ensued. SugarCRM denounced vTiger as “a lie” 163  and accused it of hijacking 
SugarCRM’s “hard work (code)” by replacing its logos with vTiger’s164. Meanwhile, vTiger 
lectured SugarCRM on the meaning of open source, and appealed to Eric Raymond and the 
Open Source Development Labs for support. The dispute silently settled in vTiger’s favor. In 
a historical light, SugarCRM’s consistent application of attribution (“badgeware”) schemes 
thus appears as a strategic safeguarding measure against further forking attempts. But it 
remains to be seen whether the latest legal incarnation is watertight. Given its paradoxical 
inconsistencies, one cannot help but wonder whether... 
1) the mandated use of the “Powered by SugarCRM” logo in interactive user interfaces has a 
lacking legal basis in the AGPLv3, 
2) or SugarCRM has found a legal loophole in the AGPLv3, or the FSF actually intended this form 
of use (the latter would seem to be in conflict with its stated intentions of freedoms), 
3) and / or that the innovative coupling to the Trademark Policy allows SugarCRM to 
circumvents the freedoms that the AGPLv3 is intended to guarantee.  
                                                     
161 John Roberts – then CEO of SugarCRM (2006‐11‐27), message sent to license-discuss mailing list of 
opensource.org. Subject: ZDNet article - why attribution matters. Retrieved Oct. 14, 2012 from 
http://lwn.net/Articles/211814/   
162 In 2004, based on version 1.5 of SugarCRM Open Source (the predecessor of Sugar CE), which was governed 
by a modified version of the Mozilla Public License 1.1 – the SugarCRM Public License (SPL) 1.1.2. The “Powered 
by SugarCRM” provisions was added to the “Exhibit B” clause as of SPL 1.1.3. Also see chapter 4.1.3.1. 
163 Forum message by John Roberts (2004‐08‐26): https://forums.vtiger.com/viewtopic.php?t=7  
164 Forum message by John Roberts (2004‐08‐27): https://forums.vtiger.com/viewtopic.php?t=11  
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Since none of these alternative explanations have yet been tested in court (to my 
knowledge), no definite answer is available.  If one were to judge merely by popular opinion, 
as widely expressed in sampled web forums, blogs and mailing lists, alternative 1 would be 
the winning candidate. Yet, SugarCRM seems to rely on a combination of the other two – or 
at least on signaling an assertive and deterring intent to defend this legal position. 
Regrettably, it was not possible to obtain any official statement by the FSF or its affiliated 
Software Freedom Law Center (SFLC). However, an unofficial statement by Aaron 
Williamson, Senior Staff Counsel at the SFLC, sheds some light on the issue:  
I'm afraid that no "authoritative answer" to your question exists; there is sufficient ambiguity 
that one cannot predict with certainty how a court would rule. I agree with you that there is a 
potential for conflict of terms where a trademark policy separate from the GPL imposes 
restrictions beyond what the GPL allows. Where the licensor has retained broad authority to 
object to "harmful" uses, it's not clear to me that there is a definite conflict; it may depend 
upon how the licensor enforces the trademark policy. If enforcement was particularly 
aggressive, i.e. if the licensor objected to a use that was clearly permitted by the GPL, it is 
possible that a court would apply equitable estoppel, i.e. rule that fairness dictates that the 
licensor can't enforce against a use its license seems clearly to permit.   
Perhaps more importantly, the GPL itself includes a "safety valve" to prevent the use of 
trademarks to unduly restrict GPL licensees: "If the Program as you received it, or any part of 
it, contains a notice stating that it is governed by this License along with a term that is a 
further restriction, you may remove that term." In other words, if a licensor adds a restriction 
that does not fall into one of the categories of permissible restrictions enumerated in Section 
7, it is moot. 
In this light, SugarCRM’s ostensible position seems vulnerable to attack. Hence, the firm is 
likely to benefit from a protracted state of legal ambiguity. For, coupled with offsetting costs 
and the potential ramifications of a trial (see previous page), one can reasonably expect an 
assertive legal posture to be just as a deterring. Of the same reason, risk‐averse would‐be 
adopters of Sugar CE code165 could benefit from a conclusive evaluation. 
                                                     
165 E.g. for use of Sugar CE (or adapted parts thereof) in a SaaS solution. See for example “Rebrand” thread on a 
SugarCRM forum, which raises the question of limited rebranding, and includes posts by SugarCRM CTO and 
co‐founder, Clint Oram: http://forums.sugarcrm.com/f134/rebrand‐63132/. See also 
http://liveweb.archive.org/http://forums.sugarcrm.com/f134/rebrand‐63132/ (Wayback Machine). 
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If SugarCRM’s apparent position were to be confirmed as legally impermeable, the firm 
would possess a very potent juridical weapon against any form of unsolicited Sugar CE code 
reuse and redistribution. But this legal interpretation would also imply that SugarCRM was, 
in effect, in obvious breach of fundamental FOSS principles166. If, on the other hand, the 
more popular interpretation were to prevail, SugarCRM would be in a significantly weaker 
juridical position to defend itself against FOSS forks. This does not mean, however, that 
SugarCRM necessarily would become critically vulnerable to competition from potential 
Sugar CE forks (see following chapter).  
 
 
  
                                                     
166 As defined in The Free Software Definition (FSD) and Open Source Definition (OSD).  
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4.4  Synthesis and concluding remarks  
This thesis has sought to shed light on the particularities of Commercial Open Source as a 
phenomenon, exemplified through a case study of SugarCRM. Based on empirical findings 
and analysis thereof, we are now in the position to revisit the initial research questions from 
chapter 1.2 and draw our conclusions: 
1. Stakeholder motivation: Who are the involved parties in the software development 
process, and what are their primary incentives for participation? 
As identified in chapter 4.2, the parties involved in the development of SugarCRM software 
fall into one or several of four main categories: 1) SugarCRM employees, 2) Affiliates 
(partners and third party complement providers), 3) Customers and 4) Sugar CE users. 
SugarCRM developers focus their concerted effort on the platform core and standard 
components for the commercial product range. Meanwhile, members of the three latter 
categories, who by definition constitute the SugarCRM community, are encouraged to 
contribute customizations and complementary modular functionality 167 . My findings 
suggest, in agreement with contemporary research on “gated communities”, that 
participation is principally utility‐driven. On the individual level, this is reflected in the 
prevalence of pecuniary incentives through employment 168 . Alternative motives for 
participation, as typically found amongst “hobbyist” and “hackers” in more conventional 
FOSS communities, play a correspondingly less significant role in this context169. On an 
institutional level, software utility, vested interests and profit motives serve as inherent 
incentives for participation170.  
To further incentivize its community constituencies and steer efforts according to own 
interests, SugarCRM employs a number of strategies – which are addressed by the next 
research question: 
                                                     
167 Language packs, themes and various forms of modular extensions (including connectors to third party 
offerings). These are shared under self‐chosen licensing terms on SugarForge and SugarExchange. 
168 Note: A significant share of Sugar CE users are employed by SMEs, start‐ups and non‐profits etc. 
169 Resulting from ex‐ante self‐selection and dampened enthusiasm among intrinsically motivated users / 
developers (see chapter 2.3.1).  
170 Software utility: The direct value of the SugarCRM use, and anticipated marginal value of added 
functionality (of which the contribution to a wider audience does not impose any significant marginal cost, but 
can have marketing benefits); Vested interests: Commitment to the SugarCRM platform for marketing 
purposes and sunk costs in one particular architecture; Profit motives: Expected derived value one can capture 
as a result of contributing (e.g. potential network effects triggered by contributed connectors to one’s own 
complementary offerings). 
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2. Strategies: Which strategies do the commercial entity employ to satisfy the 
stakeholders’ expectations and needs, whilst at the same time safeguarding 
shareholder interests? 
SugarCRM pursuits an unmistakable market‐ and sales orientation, which puts strong 
emphasis on its commercial affiliates. An extensive partner network serves as sales channels 
to a variety of market segments, and is actively engaged to provide complementary offerings 
and customizations. This is achieved through targeted partner programs171 that forge 
intimate coordinative links within SugarCRM’s value network. Privileged access to 
SugarCRM’s internal development process, along with the general availability of a shared 
source code, enables partners to address self‐identified needs directly and assures that 
SugarCRM’s does not sidetrack from its technical core competency – an open product 
platform and optional proprietary functionality that facilitates vertical product 
differentiation and price discrimination. This, in turn, is made possible through a granular IP‐
modular product architecture, deliberately managed to achieve strategic control over value 
appropriation and deter open source cannibalization. 
To empower the development process and lower the threshold for participation, SugarCRM 
offers a series of ancillary tools and shared online platforms (see chapter 4.3.2). Although 
many regard these offerings as adequate, my findings suggest there still remains room for 
significant improvements. According to interviews with the Community Manager, SugarCRM 
is aware of at least one of the reported shortcomings172 and has already included it in its 
roadmap. Given the importance of satisfactory developer toolkits (see chapter 2.3.4), 
SugarCRM is well advised to also consider the remainder of professed shortcomings. 
Although not officially acknowledged as such, SugarCRM appears to have built an elaborate 
legal framework to shield itself against unsolicited forking and partial external reuse of Sugar 
CE code (see chapter 4.3.3). In the absence of an authoritative evaluation of its juridical 
soundness, the actual strength of this formal inscription remains to be determined. If it were 
to be proven weaker than it apparently intends to be, then SugarCRM could still rely on 
other defensive mechanisms against potential forks:  
                                                     
171 Including the “Open+ Developer Program” and annual SugarCon conference. See also Appendix E. 
172 Git‐enabled hosting of projects on SugarForge, or the use of GitHub to host SugarForge projects.  
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• SugarCRM already has assured itself a pre‐emptive competitive advantage through 
strategic management of its IP‐modular product architecture, which entails 
deliberate withholding of valuable functionality from the Sugar CE. 
• SugarCRM holds standard‐setting power over its code, including application 
programming interfaces (APIs)173, on which extra functionality must rely for 
compatibility. Combined with a well‐established partner network that contributes to 
an ever growing pool of complementary functionality and services, and a mature user 
base that benefits therefrom, SugarCRM enjoys control over a two‐sided market that 
spurs network effects and lends it market power.  
Yet, as Brownstein et. al. (2006, p.15) notes, SugarCRM forks can arise to serve “different 
vertical markets.” Even with SugarCRM’s noticeable market‐ and sales orientation, with a 
large partner network to drive customizations and sales, there may still be small but 
lucrative niche segments that remain underserved. The same could be true for the low‐end 
CRM market, which a no‐frills fork could attempt to penetrate by expanding and improving 
the existing palette of generic open source functionality (corresponding to some of what 
SugarCRM reserves for its proprietary editions). And even if the generic low‐end market is 
already well saturated and unattractive as it is, the current installed base of Sugar CE could 
serve as a potential target market in its own right – one in which a FOSS fork could 
conceivably compete with Sugar CE for users and voluntary talent. Given this hypothetical 
outlook, and considering an amalgamated relationship with commercially affiliated 
community constituencies, a seemingly sensible strategy for SugarCRM would be to 
emasculate an already weak and fragmented constituency of independent community 
members. But even if this would help to stifle potential forking attempts, the actual 
implementation of such a strategy could have offsetting side‐effects. For one, it is likely to 
undermine the overall value of SugarCRM software174 and deprive the firm of a valuable 
asset175. Moreover, it is likely to weaken SugarCRM’s residual “open source goodwill” by 
stripping it of already contested open credentials. This leads us to the last research question.  
                                                     
173 Comprising its so‐called “extension framework” which facilitates “upgrade safe” extensions and adaptations 
to SugarCRM code. 
174 Based on the assumption that a sizable and healthy community of volunteers increases the value of 
corresponding software.  
175 Based on the assumption that non‐affiliated (Sugar CE) community members actually constitute a valuable 
asset by virtue of driving adoption, contributing bug reports, bug fixes, modular extensions etc.  
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3. Friction points: Following from the previous – are there notable friction points 
between involved stakeholders, which could undermine the viability of SugarCRM’s 
business model? If yes, how does the firm handle them? 
There are no noticeable direct friction points between the stakeholders represented in the 
community (Affiliates, Customers, Sugar CE users). Admittedly, this thesis has not delved 
into direct bilateral relations between these stakeholders, as the collection of such data 
would push the thesis’ scope beyond what is practically feasible176. But it is unlikely that 
relevant friction points therefore have been overlooked. This is because any direct relations 
can be expected to be of mundane nature and limited only to a subset of SugarCRM affiliates 
(e.g. resellers) and their customers. Thus, it seems fruitful first to take a step back and 
recapitulate the role these stakeholders actually play in SugarCRM’s business model.  
SugarCRM is not only a software manufacturer and vendor, but also a systems integrator 
and platform provider. Affiliates, customers and Sugar CE users contribute and derive utility 
from a mutually beneficial ecosystem that is built by SugarCRM around its open product 
platform – that is, a multifaceted constellation that in many respects resembles a value 
network177. As such, SugarCRM commands a multisided market that spurs both same‐ and 
cross‐side network‐effects178. For this to work, as is presupposed by SugarCRM’s business 
model, it must be in all the involved parties’ self‐interest to be part of the network. From this 
perspective, the autarkic value of SugarCRM’s product range is only relevant to the extent 
that it channels new members into the network – be it paying customers or voluntary code 
contributors. Conversely, as one would expect from a product labeled as “open source”, the 
autarkic value should in turn be determined by the quantity and quality of contributions 
derived from the network. In this sense, open source projects resemble workshops179, which 
“mobilize resources from different actors to solve clearly defined problems” (Berdal and 
Føleide 2008, p.17). This is only partly true for SugarCRM, since it has in effect monopolized 
the development process of standard components and their underlying core. For, as Capra 
                                                     
176 In this context, one also needs to consider that these categories are anything but discrete. That is, one can 
belong to one or several of them at once. E.g.: Sugar CE users can also be customers if they buy proprietary 
complementary services or software extensions from affiliates. 
177 As understood by Stabell and Fjeldstad (1998). 
178 E.g. Sugar CE users benefit from being many in numbers, since they provide mutual assistance (help forums) 
and contribute to the development Sugar CE and compatible modular extensions (same‐side). Meanwhile, 
Customers benefit from core code contributions and modular extension provided by both Sugar CE users and 
SugarCRM affiliates (cross‐side).  
179 In reference to “value shops”, as understood by Stabell and Fjeldstad (1998). 
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and Wasserman (2008, p.12, my emphasis) already noted: “SugarCRM governance and 
managerial styles are actually very similar to those of a traditional closed software project, 
with the only exceptions that most of the code is open and that external people can 
contribute code”. That is not to say that open access to the code has been rendered 
irrelevant. On the contrary, the availability of source code (even for proprietary 
components) is a decisive value driver. But even if this openness is benign and noteworthy, it 
does not quite seem to qualify as “open source” – at least not in the sense the term is 
commonly construed. Yes, the Sugar CE edition is licensed under the OSI‐approved AGPLv3, 
which in the eyes of most FOSS supporters is laudable. And, yes, one can contribute to a 
shared and open code repository – albeit under the condition of copyright assignment. But 
then again, restrictive managerial practices and innovative legal acrobatics180 seem to defy 
several implicit promises of open source. Even if a comparative “openness deficit” can be 
expected for COSS projects, SugarCRM stands out with a remarkably constrictive approach. 
According to a taxonomy proposed by Dahalnder and Magnusson (2005), this makes 
SugarCRM a probable candidate for the “parasitic” category, characterized by “violation of 
basic norms, values and principles” or perceptions of being a “free rider”. Herein lies a 
conundrum comprising a whole set of related friction points (see table on next page):  
                                                     
180 I.e., far‐reaching supplementary licensing terms  that render the software “badgeware” in the eyes of critics. 
And, if seen together with SugarCRM’s Trademark Policy, appear to circumvent the FSF’s freedoms / OSI’s 
criteria relating to free distribution of derived works (see chapter 4.3.3). 
75 
Friction point COSS / SugarCRM perspectives  Opposing FOSS perspectives 
Copyright 
assignment 
Precondition for dual licensing, without which the business 
model would not be commercially sustainable.  
Disincentive to contribute because of 
fears of going (partially) private. Free 
Software purists: “Immoral”. 
Withholding of 
value driving 
functionality 
from Sugar CE 
1) Pre‐emptive competitive advantage against OSS clones, 
2) wider scope for price discrimination and product 
differentiation for commercial editions, and 3) stronger 
incentives for Sugar CE users to migrate to a commercial 
edition. 
“Crippleware” / damaged good, “open 
core”. Disincentive to contribute 
because of lacking assurances against 
potentially exclusive proprietary use. 
“Powered by 
SugarCRM” logo 
1) Official stance: Legitimate author attribution in 
recognition of invested work. Not confirmed, but highly 
plausible: 2) brand promotion, and 3) thwart forking 
attempts / stifle unsolicited external code reuse. 
“Badgeware”. Violation of basic FOSS 
principles, especially when coupled 
with the SugarCRM Trademark Policy.  
“closed” 
governance 
practices, even 
restrictive by 
COSS standards 
1) Need for managerial control to ensure that customers’ 
needs are efficiently met. 
2) Speculative: Diminish the influence of FOSS enthusiasts 
and vigilantes, who could interfere with a commercially 
guided development process. 
Overly restrictive, lack of procedural 
fairness. No real influence over shared 
Sugar CE code base. De‐facto 
relegation to work on small‐scale 
peripheral complements, which not 
need to be open source.  
Preferential 
treatment of 
commercially 
affiliated 
community 
constituents 
and third 
parties 
Reasonable supplementary approach of differentiation to 
utilize and enhance commercially vested interests in 
SugarCRM’s product platform. This is 1) to strengthen the 
firm’s sales channels through a co‐evolution of capabilities 
with partners, and to 2) stimulate demand driven 
customization and development of modular complements 
(extensions, plug‐ins etc.), 3) triggering network effects 
which increase the overall value of the product platform.  
Deficient distributional fairness (in 
terms of underprovided focus and 
priority). Perception of being kept out 
of the loop (the latter not directly 
observed, but implied through 
qualitative responses to the 
questionnaire). 
Table 3: Friction points between SugarCRM and FOSS community. 
It is probably because SugarCRM has sought to counterbalance inherent weaknesses of its 
COSS business model, that it has followed an increasingly constrictive trajectory. Ever since 
vTiger appeared as fork of its Open Source edition in late 2004, and SugarCRM’s leadership 
felt compelled to introduce attribution (“badgeware”) terms to its infamous “Exhibit B” 
clause, the company has remained at odds with the wider FOSS community. This appears to 
be expected from a theoretical perspective (Osterloh and Rota, 2007 p.163): “once a 
technology enters the commercial phase of competition, one would expect the collective 
invention mode to break down (Meyer, 2003). […] Appropriation concerns start to dominate; 
exploration of the potential of a technology is replaced by exploitation of its commercial 
value”. Hence, SugarCRM is likely to have sought to avoid open source cannibalization of its 
proprietary editions by opportunistically changing its sharing behavior. Such cannibalization 
would incur if (1) the open source edition left too little utility scope for feasible product 
differentiation and price discrimination181, and / or (2) if competitive forks were to appear 
and deprive SugarCRM’s value network of development externalities and customers. In a 
worst case scenario, a potent fork would capture large swathes of the Sugar CE installed 
base and soon be in a position to compete directly against SugarCRM’s commercial editions. 
                                                     
181 I.e. by virtue of providing extensive value that cannot be monetarily appropriated under open source terms, 
and lack of enough marginal proprietary value to maintain commercial sustainability. 
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In the event that this fork also managed to offer low switching costs182 to SugerCRM’s 
affiliates and customers, negative feedback loops could lead an already weakened value 
network to implode. And one should not necessarily discard FOSS projects as cacophonic 
hydras unable to muster or coordinate the required efforts. For history has shown that, if led 
by a mobilizing entity, FOSS projects can even outmatch their proprietary counterparts183. 
On the face of it, if one were to judge simply by official announcements, the company 
remains dedicated to the open source spirit. But as a result of putting safe value 
appropriation over risky value creation, it has in effect undercut the relevance of a voluntary 
FOSS community and compromised its open credentials. On the other hand, it has managed 
to mobilize its commercial affiliates – whose contributions now dwarf those of Sugar CE 
users. So, one may ask, why not go “the whole nine yards” and take the project private? If 
the open source edition represents a “wild card” liability and voluntary developers can be 
crowded out by employed ones, would this not be an appropriate move? Surely, even if 
confirming their suspicions, FOSS “purists” would applaud it as honest. Sugar CE could be 
transformed into proprietary freeware, the source code kept available for inspection and 
mundane non‐redistributable customizations184, and SugarForge rebranded as what it 
essentially is: a distribution platform for complementary software components. Of course, 
SugarCRM would then also need to substitute its “Commercial Open Source CRM” slogan, 
preferably with one that retains attuned connotations185. And it could still encourage 
development of open source peripheral extensions. With prudent community management, 
SugarCRM might more or less continue business as usual. And it would no longer be exposed 
to accusations of operating under a false flag, nor fear inadvertent cannibalization from an 
open source edition. However, this line of thought implies that open source has become a 
strategic anachronism for SugarCRM, at a time when it has already played out its “disruptive 
innovation” purpose. Further, it presupposes that the “Commercial Open Source” brand is 
non‐essential for marketing purposes, and that a transition would not indeed provoke a fork 
from the last Sugar CE distribution. Last but not least, it disregards vested interest in the 
status quo. With an eminent open source serial‐entrepreneur at the helm, it would 
undoubtedly seem ironic if SugarCRM took this symbolically strong step. 
                                                     
182 E.g. through a support framework, technical compatibility and / or convenient migration offerings. 
183 E.g. The Mozilla Foundation (Firefox) vs. Microsoft (Internet Explorer).  
184 Under terms that are often referred to as “shared source” or “source‐available”.  
185 E.g. “Community Driven CRM”. 
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SugarCRM appears to have found a pragmatic middle ground. Rather than being twofaced or 
ambivalent, as some interpretations may suggest, this proposition infers that the company 
realistically sees and treats its open source edition according to what it plausibly can be 
construed as – an emotionally labile hobgoblin that serves and dwells under the same roof 
as the commercial editions. Although essentially friendly and helpful, this troublesome 
creature has an unpredictable temperament and can become mischievous if aroused. 
Specimens of this particular breed are known for their ability to work their masters’ land and 
scare off intruders from what they unwittingly confuse as their own dominion. Conversely, 
they also display an inherent disposition to opportunistically switch their allegiance. In fact, 
it is known that some have served under several masters simultaneously – which can have 
disturbing ramifications. Exactly that happened in late 2004, when our exemplar got 
tempted into helping a stranger to encroach onto Mr. Sugar’s very own territory. Angered 
and disappointed, the old master resolutely burned his distinctive mark onto the hobgoblin’s 
forehead, later followed by a nose ring to better control the incensed beast. Because of its 
lacking trustworthiness and natural propensity to interfere in the work on the land, it was 
confined to the narrow perimeters of the garden. The master’s sons had by now grown old 
and strong enough to plow, while their reliable friends helped out with sowing and fertilizing 
the fields. And, as reaffirmed by the master’s interpretation of Sun‐Tzu and Machiavelli, one 
is wise to keep enemies even closer than friends. Not that this hobgoblin was considered an 
adversary as such, but it could certainly be enticed into becoming one. This is realpolitik, so 
the master reasoned. Never mind those eccentric animal rights activists who keep 
complaining about cruelty and unnaturally constrained living conditions. Surely, they are 
misguided. After all, he knows this breed better than anyone, and the law does not require 
him to make any concessions. Or does it? Well, if so, he could always try to put his servant 
out of its misery186. But then he would also lose a deterrent to trespassers. Even worse, that 
creature would be all the more likely to turn against him if he failed in his first attempt. Not 
to mention the odd gardening work it still performs, which is so nicely depicted on the labels 
of the land’s sweet produce. Best not to feed the labile friend too much muscle building 
proteins then, just in case a judge came along and forced him to reconsider his options. 
                                                     
186 I.e. take Sugar CE private (discontinue the development or distribute further versions under proprietary 
terms). This effort would not be successful if a potent and competitive fork appeared.  
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With reference to Creswell (2007, p.67), this somewhat caricatured analogy187 is meant to 
“visually portray a conditional matrix that elucidates the social, historical, and economic 
conditions influencing the central phenomenon”. Although subjective in tone, it effectively 
illustrates the issue at hand – friction points that could undermine the viability of 
SugarCRM’s business model. And regardless of how well it reflects actual intentions and 
actions, it succeeds in pinning down the underlying dynamics. The hobgoblin is emblematic 
of all COSS projects, but the story plays out differently according to varying exogenous and 
endogenous factors. As exemplified by MySQL, it can end well for all involved parties. In 
another version188, a disgruntled and determined hobgoblin finds considerable support in 
the activist, and eventually manages to become its own master.  
The ending of SugarCRM’s story remains to be written. Based on observations put forward in 
this thesis, one could just as well have interpreted Sugar CE as a working horse with a 
detrimental predisposition to metamorphose into a Trojan one. Whichever metaphor one 
chooses, SugarCRM’s business model has innately steered the firm into a problematic 
zugzwang position, which it could only escape by making significant concessions. So far, it 
seems to have succeeded through a consistent strategy of containment and control – albeit 
with accompanying accusations of foul play. To strengthen its defense, it has sought to 
reinterpret and augment the rules of the game. If SugarCRM’s underlying legal stance were 
to endure the scrutiny of an independent judge, then it would have achieved the feat of 
dodging a potentially dangerous genetic weakness in its business model. Even if this 
effectively renders Sugar CE’s labor potential trifling, then at least it would no longer pose a 
credible threat. Alternatively, if a judge were to rule SugarCRM’s apparent legal position as 
inconsistent with the applied AGPLv3 license, the company might have to consider the 
prospect of transmuting its business model into a “source available”‐freeware variant. Yet 
given SugarCRM’s preeminent market position and preemptive application of supplementary 
tactics, this thesis suggests that such a controversial and risky step would still be avoidable. 
It remains the privilege of a complex SugarCRM actor‐network to play out its own story 
through inscribed proxies and direct interplay. One can attempt to intervene from the 
outside, but it is up to SugarCRM to determine the general direction. For, after all, the 
company now stands as the undisputed master of its “Commercial Open Source CRM” turf.  
                                                     
187 Reminiscent to a narrative tone found among FOSS pundits: Sarcastic, speculative and tendentious.  
188 One well known example is that of Joomla, an open source CMS that became a successful fork of Mambo.  
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4.5 Further research 
Although there already exists a considerable body of accumulated research on open source, 
the field of single‐vendor commercial open source remains noticeably understudied. I 
therefore hope that my thesis has contributed some useful findings and new conceptual 
angles to this particular academic niche. However, I realize that I have only scraped on the 
surface of what could, and should, be investigated further. The following areas of inquiry 
appear of particular interest for further research: 
• Retrieval of concealed data: What is, for example, the number of active community 
members, and how can one attain related information (e.g. average churn rate) for 
different community constituencies? 
• A multivariate and comparative approach: How do variables such as FOSS community 
size, legal frameworks (restrictive‐permissive), project maturity (basic‐intermediate‐
advanced), predominant motivational factors (intrinsic‐extrinsic) and governance 
models (open‐closed)  correlate with one another? 
• Other theoretical frameworks: In a community with mutually competing commercial 
affiliates of a single governing COSS entity, how can one assure that valuable 
information (code) is shared with the community and not hoarded? Such questions 
could be enlightened through the use of game theory. Similarly, systems dynamics, 
agent‐based modeling and scenario analysis appear to have great potential in this 
line of inquiry. 
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Appendix A: Terminology 
This appendix clarifies my understanding of the terms marked with asterisks (*) throughout 
this thesis. 
Fork / forking 
A fork is source code that is copied from an original project, and used as the foundation of a 
another. The term is also applied on resulting new FOSS projects (e.g. LibreOffice as a fork of 
OpenOffice.org). The legal basis for forking are freedoms / criteria189 of the Free Software 
Foundation (FSF) and Open Source Initiative (OSI), which are reflected in officially certified 
licenses.  
Forking (also used as a verb) is understood to be detrimental to the originating project, as it 
creates a schism amongst its user base and developer community. It is also likely to result in 
duplication of effort, and to undermine the trust and authority of the originating project 
maintainer. When FOSS software is forked, the new fork inherits the license that governed 
the originating source code. 
FOSS 
A generic term used to refer to software that is “free” (as defined by the Free Software 
Foundation) and / or “open source” (as defined by the Open Source Initiative).   
ISV  
Independent Software Vendor. To SugarCRM, ISVs fall into one of the main categories of 
partners (in addition to VARs). 
OEM  
Original Equipment Manufacturer. Refers to a manufacturer of products that are purchased 
and typically branded by other companies (value‐added resellers / VARs). OEM is sometimes 
also used to refer to the product itself – i.e. as original equipment from manufacturer. 
SugarCRM offers an OEM version of its software (Sugar Platform Edition with its own license 
terms, through the “Powered By SugarCRM OEM Program”)190.  
                                                     
189 By the Free Software Definition (FSD) and Open Source Definition (OSD), respectively.  
190 Sugar Platform Edition FAQs. Retrieved May 28, 2012, from  
http://www.sugarcrm.com/page/sugar‐platform‐edition‐faqs/en 
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Project maintainer 
A project maintainer (PM) is the entity, typically a single person, which holds the formal 
leadership position of a FOSS project. Also see chapter 2.3.3.  
SugarExchange 
Similar to SugarForge, it is a distribution platform for complementary software components. 
But it also serves a “market place” (sales channel) for commercial complement “providers” 
(payments are facilitated through PayPal), and offers official certification of modular 
extensions (“Certified by SugarCRM”). However, a large proportion of the offerings here are 
free and uncertified, and overlap with the ones found on SugarForge. As with SugarForge, a 
large share of the offerings also appear outdated (not supporting the latest versions, and / or 
with reviews that are several years old).  
SugarForge 
According to SugarCRM itself, “SugarForge is the destination for the Sugar community to 
collaborate and develop Sugar extensions”191. Essentially, it is a distribution platform for 
complementary software components, just as SugarExchange, albeit with collaborative 
features and a more “open” look. As with SugarExchange, a large share of the offerings also 
appear outdated (not supporting the latest versions, with reviews that are several years old, 
and / or no notable project activity). And, although it is meant as a platform for collaboration, 
my observations cannot confirm any noteworthy collaboration amongst community 
members. See chapter 4.3.2 for more findings.  
VAR  
Value-Added Reseller. A company that adds new features or services (i.e. value) to an existing 
product, and typically resells it under its own brand. In the software industry, VARs often add 
features to a product to target specific customers with corresponding needs. Thus, to 
SugarCRM, VARs are one of two main categories of partners (in addition to ISVs).        
  
                                                                                                                                                                     
 
191 See http://www.sugarforge.org/  
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Appendix B: Review of The Cathedral and the Bazaar 
This appendix contains my assessment of Eric S. Raymond’s nineteen “lessons” presented in 
”The Cathedral and the Bazaar” 192 . Each listed item refers to one lesson (original 
enumeration and naming), with my own reflections stated below.  All citations refer to this 
particular (official) online edition, unless stated otherwise. In the closing, this Appendix also 
touches upon some of Raymond’s other related work. 
1. Every good work of software starts by scratching a developer's personal itch. 
This is another way to say that “Necessity is the mother of invention”. In the context of 
OSS, however, this statement has particular relevance: A piece of software needs not be 
a new stand‐alone application, but could also be a patch or fork of existing OSS (i.e. the 
“barriers to entry” are significantly lower when existing code can be adopted and 
adapted).  
2. Good programmers know what to write. Great ones know what to rewrite (and reuse). 
Building on lesson 1, this is a normative advice to rewrite and reuse code, rather than 
reinventing the wheel (or parts of it). The rationale is that it is better to be a smaller 
contributor to something bigger than writing something from scratch. Not only does this 
provide a higher probability of widespread use, but also assures better quality (wisdom 
of the crowds, see lesson 8) and overall increased utilization of limited resources.  
3. “Plan to throw one away; you will, anyhow.” (Fred Brooks, The Mythical Man-Month) 
As stated, this is a renowned lesson already learned by Fred Brooks (which states that 
you should plan to build a pilot, since you will need to do so anyhow). In the context of 
OSS, this is one way of saying that it is never too late to jump ship – to realize that a 
project has severe limitations (sunk costs), but your experience (along with parts of the 
code) could be beneficial for another OSS project. This is a complementary interpretation 
to the straight‐forward one (i.e. to foresee the need for a pilot), which is just as relevant 
for OSS. 
  
                                                     
192 Retrieved Jan 24, 2012, from http://catb.org/~esr/writings/homesteading/cathedral‐bazaar/index.html  
Version 3, revision 1.57, dated Sept. 11, 2000  
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4. If you have the right attitude, interesting problems will find you. 
This is, as I interpret it, the expected result of other lessons being followed (both by 
oneself, and by others in the wider OSS realm). Raymond exemplifies this through his 
experience: He started off by joining one project, realized its limitations, found a better 
alternative and “jumped ship”. After he had sent his first patches to the new project, he 
noticed that its maintainer had lost interest in it – which leads us to the next lesson: 
5. When you lose interest in a program, your last duty to it is to hand it off to a competent 
successor. 
This is as much a lesson as an embracement of a theretofore tacit OSS convention of 
good conduct. Also, one might expect that a disinterested project maintainer recognizes 
the benefit of handing over his project, rather than seeing it fall into obsolescence or 
being forked. 
6. Treating your users as co-developers is your least-hassle route to rapid code improvement 
and effective debugging. 
As Raymond states: “Properly cultivated, [… the users] can become co‐developers”, and 
further: “In fact, I think Linus's cleverest and most consequential hack was not the 
construction of the Linux kernel itself, but rather his invention of the Linux development 
model.” Clearly, this lesson is as relevant to commercial OSS, as it is to conventional OSS. 
By listening to users, giving feedback, adapting the software according to their wishes 
etc., users will be more likely to join and stay in the community of co‐developers. This 
matters, because an active and sizable community is an indispensable precondition for 
effective collective innovation and development. The ideal is that as many of the 
software’s users contribute to the development process (i.e. as long as the project 
maintainer holds a certain minimum of administrative capabilities, and the community of 
users and developers is internally aligned). Thus, lowering the threshold for participation 
is fundamental. One way to achieve this is by offering “toolkits for user innovation” (von 
Hippel and Katz, 2002).  
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7. Release early. Release often [(RERO)]. And listen to your customers. 
In contrast to the traditional Cathedral model, the Bazaar model relies on an agile 
development philosophy that emphasizes rapid iterations of new releases and small 
incremental improvements193. This ensures a tight feedback loop between users and 
developers (i.e. identification of bugs / popular features by users, and fixes / 
enhancement by developers). As pointed out in lesson 6, users can also be developers 
(and developers are almost always users). But even if a developer reports a bug, it does 
not need to be this individual that is most competent or motivated to fix it (see next 
lesson). RERO also ensures to keep the “temperature high” by showing constant and 
steady progress. As Raymond explains: “Linus [Torvalds] was keeping his hacker/users 
constantly stimulated and rewarded—stimulated by the prospect of having an ego‐
satisfying piece of the action, rewarded by the sight of constant (even daily) 
improvement in their work.” Likewise, one can plausibly argue, the piecemeal approach 
of RERO reduces overall complexity of the project by focusing attention on a manageable 
scope of collectively identified set of bugs / feature requests at any given time. 
The drawback, some may say, is that the software is undergoing constant change (not all 
users like that), and new releases are likely to contain more bugs than otherwise. But the 
remedy is simple: The offering of “stable releases” with predictable intervals (i.e. when 
the developers deem the provided features to be ready for a wider audience). The 
developers, meanwhile, can continue to work on interim releases at the very “bleeding 
edge” of code evolution. In the context of dual‐licensing, it is intuitively beneficial to 
harmonize the stable releases across different editions (concurrently containing the 
same versions of core features), to encourage as much user‐developer synchronization 
as possible. By having a shared reference point to stable releases, it is easier to utilize the 
community for support and bug‐identification across different editions. The approach 
can also serve as an effective barrier against unintended or excessive divergence 
between different editions, which would increase complexity and reduce the very 
relevance of an OSS community. 
 
                                                     
193 It should be noted that the benefits of short incremental iterations have also been recognized for 
proprietary software development, where agile methodologies / development frameworks (e.g. Scrum and 
Kanban) have since become widely adopted.  
93 
8. Given a large enough beta-tester and co-developer base, almost every problem will be 
characterized quickly and the fix obvious to someone. 
The rationale behind this statement194, which Raymond dubbed “Linus's Law”, can be 
deconstructed as such: 
Effective division of labor and a transparent, self‐regulating marked: As Adam Smith 
firmly established as an axiom of capitalism, division of labor results in increased overall 
productivity and quality. The same general logic applies to OSS195.  Raymond refers to 
Linus Torvalds saying that “the person who understands and fixes the problem is not 
necessarily or even usually the person who first characterizes it”, and further: 
“Somebody finds the problem […] and somebody else understands it”. Thus, the picking 
of tasks is done by a benign mixture of induced chance (someone among many beta‐
testers and developers discovers a bug) and skills / creativity / inclination (someone else 
understands and fixes it). A transparent market 196 allows tasks to be distributed 
efficiently by stimulating “individuals [to] spontaneously align with the problems they are 
most inclined to solve anyway” (Garzarelli et al., 2008, p.120) and thereupon voluntarily 
self‐select tasks without much need for centralized coordination or interference197. Seen 
in relation to the previous lesson (RERO), it becomes apparent that the near‐to self‐
regulating process of identification, comprehension and code submission is rapid and 
perpetually ongoing.  
Reduction of complexity: Raymond states that “[i]n the cathedral‐builder view of 
programming, bugs and development problems are tricky, insidious, deep phenomena. It 
takes months of scrutiny by a dedicated few to develop confidence that you've winkled 
them all out. […] In the bazaar view, on the other hand, you assume that bugs are 
generally shallow phenomena—or, at least, that they turn shallow pretty quickly when 
exposed to a thousand eager co‐developers pounding on every single new release.” The 
contrast between these two development stereotypes is stark on this point, as are the 
implications. Development of software may require a wide skill set by its creators. Even if 
                                                     
194 More colloquially formulated: ”Given enough eyeballs, all bugs are shallow”. 
195 Albeit in a non‐traditional sense (neither based on pure vertical or horizontal specialization of work, but on 
ad‐hoc self‐selection of atomic tasks by a pool of loosely associated volunteers and enthusiasts). 
196Here understood as the socio‐technological construct of an Internet aided community, including toolkits for 
bug‐reporting and revision control, which distribute information openly and effectively to all involved parties. 
197 I.e. other than the general procedural framework that is established by the project‐/ package maintainer, 
and the process of choosing and including contributed modifications for upcoming releases. 
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all anticipated skills needed for a particular software feature or workflow interval are 
assigned to a dedicated team of specialists, there is no guarantee that the matching of 
actual capabilities198 and (often unforeseen) challenges is optimal. The bazaar model, on 
the other hand, seems to suffer from redundancy (several volunteers occasionally taking 
on the same challenges simultaneously). However (Garzarelli et al., 2008, p.127, original 
emphasis): “The redundancy is not a shortcoming […]. It engenders economies that have 
the ability to capitalize on multiple, intersecting knowledge combinatorics. These 
redundant economies from parallel, overlapping inputs encourage a production mode 
whereby being specialized in a particular task is not a conditio sine qua non to contribute: 
A contributor may still be a programmer in the formal sense or a final user with 
programming skills, but his input(s) may not always directly reflect his primary specialty. 
What matters is the spontaneity of the contribution because the shared belief is that 
there’s potentially something to learn from everyone. In fact […] the central tenet of the 
bazaar is that the benefits of tapping from a virtually unlimited knowledge pool through 
a redundant division of labor outweigh all other costs, including coordination costs.” This 
is a diametric opposite understanding of Brook’s Law199, conceived on the basis of 
closed‐source development, which “predicts that the complexity and communication 
costs of a project rise with the square of the number of developers, while work done 
only rises linearly.” 
After the publication of “The Cathedral and the Bazaar”, this lesson was one of the most 
hotly debated. Gates (2003, pp.174‐75) referred to it as a “one of the mantras of the 
open‐source community”, and pointed out that it remained to be confirmed by empirical 
studies. Since then, several studies have assessed the relationship between OSS projects’ 
community size and the projects’ technical success. The results have been mixed, and 
suggest that other (correlated) variables are at play – such as maturity and novelty of the 
project, the ratio between core‐ and periphery developers / beta testers, composition 
and distribution of capabilities, and modularity of the code (e.g. Midha and Palvia, 2012). 
But none of the studies I found seem to be conclusive on the matter, either because of 
limited samples or narrow methodological approaches. Clearly, more thorough research 
is required. 
                                                     
198 E.g. wider set of relevant skills and experience, creativity, attention and motivation. 
199 Original formulation: ”Adding manpower to a late software project makes it later” (Brooks 1975, p.25)  
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However, one variable that seems to be conclusively important is modularity of the code: 
As mentioned by Torvalds (1999), “for without it [modularity], you cannot have people 
working in parallel”. With a modular design, multiple programmers can work to build 
new functions into the same module (ibid, p.898). This brings us to the next lesson. 
9. Smart data structures and dumb code works a lot better than the other way around. 
This lesson may not be intuitive to someone without software development experience. 
One can think of a pool of builders and craftsmen, collaborating to build a new house. 
Data structures represent the commonly understood principles of sound building 
practices, and the blueprints based thereon. The code, meanwhile, may represent actual 
implementations of the house (e.g. a corridor with doors to adjacent rooms). If the house 
were a patchwork of excellent craftsmanship, you could get a corridor with splendid 
doors and floors. But the floor might be at a different level than of the adjacent rooms, 
and the door frames (designed for the rooms) too small or wide to fit with the doors. 
With some ad‐hoc tweaking, one could perhaps get it to work, but the overall process 
would become more expensive and is likely to trigger conflicts among stakeholders.  On 
the other hand, if the house had been built according to sound building practices (e.g. 
modularity with standardized interfaces for different segments) the house would get a 
consistent design even without splendid floors. And since the different segments have 
standardized and predictable interfaces (e.g. doors and door frames, toilets and 
plumbing), one could easily upgrade them independently at a later stage. 
Modularity is a particularly important aspect, since it allows participants to work in 
parallel (see previous lesson), to encapsulate complexity and abstract / assign specialized 
functionality to dedicated modules. Thus, as Torvalds claims200, “the difference between 
a bad programmer and a good one is whether he considers his code or his data 
structures more important. Bad programmers worry about the code. Good programmers 
worry about data structures and their relationships.” 
 
                                                     
200 Email from Linus Trovalds to John Smirl (27 July 2006), available on LWN.net: 
http://lwn.net/Articles/193245/  
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10. If you treat your beta-testers as if they're your most valuable resource, they will respond 
by becoming your most valuable resource. 
In short, Raymond’s reasoning on this point can be summarized as such: 
• Keep your users up to date, and encourage them to participate. 
• Ask users for advice, listen to them, and “stroke” those that provide feedback / 
patches. 
• Release early and often (RERO) ‐ i.e. lesson 7. 
Raymond could have been clearer on what he meant by “encouraging people to 
participate” and “stroking them” as a reward. This is because non‐pecuniary incentives 
play an essential role in OSS development (e.g. Sauer 2007). Such incentives can be 
provided either directly (such as bilateral recognition) and indirectly (e.g. offering an 
open forum through which multilateral peer recognition can be exchanged and 
stimulated). See also chapter 2.3.1 on motivations. 
11. The next best thing to having good ideas is recognizing good ideas from your users. 
Sometimes the latter is better. 
This attitude / realization is an effective antidote to any form of the so‐called NIH (“not 
invented here”) syndrome, and an obvious precondition to any form for open and 
collective mode of innovation. What sets the Bazaar model apart from conventional 
corporate innovation is that it has translated this understanding into the core of its 
culture and modus operandi. However, this is less a question of “either‐or” than of “to 
which extent”. Commercial OSS projects in particular, can run a risk of selective attention 
towards different stakeholders. 
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12. Often, the most striking and innovative solutions come from realizing that your concept 
of the problem was wrong. 
As Raymond puts it: “When you hit a wall in development—when you find yourself hard 
put to think past the next patch—it's often time to ask not whether you've got the right 
answer, but whether you're asking the right question. Perhaps the problem needs to be 
reframed”. This is intuitive, and just as relevant to commercial projects. But it is, in fact, 
more than a reframing of the problem per se. If time and effort have been put into 
solving the wrong problem, it is just as much a question of ignoring incurred sunk costs 
and handling vested interests when considering the degree of reframing.  
In the context of COSS, the decision to reframe a problem or act upon the resulting 
implications could be more complex than for pure OSS projects. Say, such implications 
would entail a change in offered features or functionality (albeit superior), the COSS 
entity may be legally committed to offer bug‐fixing, support and updates for the current 
version. Thus, unless it is possible to convince all customers to “upgrade”, parallel 
development and support paths may be required.  
13. “Perfection (in design) is achieved not when there is nothing more to add, but rather 
when there is nothing more to take away.” 
Paraphrasing Antoine de Saint‐Exupéry, Raymond reformulates what is commonly known 
as the KISS principle (“Keep it simple, stupid”, or “keep it short and simple”). The 
underlying belief is that complexity can be reduced (and often performance improved) 
by promoting simplicity and minimalism. For OSS in particular, this maxim is of highest 
relevance. Code that is maintained and augmented by a diverse set of contributors must 
be comprehensible and easy to build upon.  
14. Any tool should be useful in the expected way, but a truly great tool lends itself to uses 
you never expected. 
This point is of no particular relevance in the context of (C)OSS. 
15. When writing gateway software of any kind, take pains to disturb the data stream as 
little as possible—and never throw away information unless the recipient forces you to! 
This point is of no particular relevance in the context of (C)OSS. 
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16. When your language is nowhere near Turing-complete, syntactic sugar can be your 
friend. 
This point is of no particular relevance in the context of (C)OSS. 
17. A security system is only as secure as its secret. Beware of pseudo-secrets. 
This point is of no particular relevance in the context of (C)OSS. 
18. To solve an interesting problem, start by finding a problem that is interesting to you. 
This is a rephrasing of lesson 1, as Raymond puts it, “in a perhaps more useful way”.   
19. Provided the development coordinator has a communications medium at least as good as 
the Internet, and knows how to lead without coercion, many heads are inevitably better 
than one. 
Raymond cites the anarchist Kropotkin's Memoirs of a Revolutionist to explain the nature 
of the Internet, and thus identifies the compatible mode of planning and action as the 
“principle of common understanding”201. As a result, in Raymond’s words, “[t]he Linux 
world behaves in many respects like a free market or an ecology, a collection of selfish 
agents attempting to maximize utility which in the process produces a self‐correcting 
spontaneous order more elaborate and efficient than any amount of central planning 
could have achieved.” 
It is interesting to see Raymond use the term “selfish” in this context, as the Open Source 
movement is often conceived and depicted as the opposite: Idealistic, almost to the 
extent of altruistic. Although this idealism may be a contributing factor of motivation in 
parts of the movement, Raymond seems to have a point in that most OSS developers are 
driven by some form of self‐interest. In his words, “[t]he ``utility function'' Linux hackers 
are maximizing is not classically economic, but is the intangible of their own ego 
satisfaction and reputation among other hackers. Or more specifically, in the words of 
Lakhani and von Hippel (2003): “motives used to explain why users would voluntarily 
work on these basic tasks include: (1) a user’s direct need for the software and software 
improvements worked upon; (2) enjoyment of the work itself; and (3) the enhanced 
                                                     
201 The aim of which “can be achieved only through the severe effort of many converging wills”. This stands in 
contrast to the “principle of command”, which is “effectively impossible to apply among volunteers in the 
anarchist's paradise we call the Internet”. 
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reputation that may flow from making high‐quality contributions to an open source 
project.” Even a “mundane but necessary task”, such as support, can be explained by 
such motives202 (ibid). See also chapter 2.3.1 on motivations. 
As much as the Internet defines the viable palette of leadership types, it facilitates and 
stimulates certain forms of communication and cooperation. Indeed, the Internet is a 
precondition for the Bazaar model to work, as it enables the rapid circulation of 
information, automation of tasks, and custom made toolkits for distributed 
development.  
Raymond thus concludes:  
Perhaps in the end the open-source culture will triumph not because cooperation is morally right 
or software ``hoarding'' is morally wrong […], but simply because the closed-source world cannot 
win an evolutionary arms race with open-source communities that can put orders of magnitude 
more skilled time into a problem.  
In hindsight, this somewhat presumptuous postulation deserves to be taken seriously. 
Indeed, if not constituting a self‐fulfilling prophecy, then at least The Cathedral and The 
Bazaar served a catalyst by spreading the word and encouraging mainstream adoption203.  
In a less cited publication, Raymond (1999b) augments his argumentation with economic 
reasoning. Building on game‐theory models, he presents an analysis of the stability of open 
source cooperation, and proposes models “for sustainable funding of open‐source 
development”. Interestingly, and perhaps not surprisingly, he suggests that network effects 
and commoditization inevitably will force open source into hitherto proprietary market 
segments204, and further asserts that such trends are already visible (in 1999) – even for “the 
heaviest business applications, such as ERPs”205. As he continues (in chapter 10.4): 
If present trends continue, the central challenge of software technology and product 
management in the next century will be knowing when to let go -- when to allow closed code to 
pass into the open-source infrastructure in order to exploit the peer-review effect and capture 
higher returns in service and other secondary markets. There are obvious revenue incentives not 
                                                     
202 Here also understood to include reciprocal helping and benefits of attaining knowledge / information.  
203 E.g., as seemed to be the case with Netscape.  
204 Given higher “payoffs”, e.g. through comparative advantages in competitive markets: Labor externalities 
that spur production of complements and drive adoption of a given software.  
205 I.e. Enterprise Resource Planning software. Interestingly, this is a good parallel to the CRM market. 
100 
to miss the crossover point too far in either direction. Beyond that, there's a serious opportunity 
risk in waiting too long -- you could get scooped by a competitor going open-source in the same 
market niche. The reason this is a serious issue is that both the pool of users and the pool of 
talent available to be recruited into open-source cooperation for any given product category is 
limited, and recruitment tends to stick. If two producers are the first and second to open-source 
competing code of roughly equal function, the first is likely to attract the most users and the 
most and best-motivated co-developers; the second will have to take leavings. Recruitment 
tends to stick, as users gain familiarity and developers sink time investments in the code itself. 
Again, Raymond concludes his work with “some tentative predictions of the future”: 
In a future that includes competition from open source, we can expect that the eventual destiny 
of any software technology will be to either die or become part of the open infrastructure itself. 
While this is hardly happy news for entrepreneurs who would like to collect rent on closed 
software forever, it does suggest that the software industry as a whole will remain 
entrepreneurial, with new niches constantly opening up at the upper (application) end and a 
limited lifespan for closed-IP monopolies as their product categories fall into infrastructure206. 
In spite of building on a number speculative conjectures, Raymond’s appealing reasoning has 
stood the test of time. And even if some critique is warranted, as also proven by this 
appendix, its mere historic influence makes it an obvious academic reference point. Thus, as 
perhaps most open source scholars, I have found it useful to start my research on open 
source by delving into probably the most cited work in the field. It has provided me a 
valuable conceptual foundation, which later helped me in the process of interpreting 
findings from my problem domain – SugarCRM. As such, it should be recognized, for better 
or worse, as an early influence on my research.  
 
 
  
                                                     
206 Implying commoditized market segments governed by strong standards. 
101 
Appendix C: FOSS motivations, “social practice view” 
This is a summary (quoting) of theoretical conjectures and propositions made by von Krogh, 
Haefliger, Spaeth and Wallin, 2012 pp.666‐8 (“motivation–practice framework” based on 
their “social practice view”, which is complementary to the more common “self‐
determination view” – see chapter 2.3.1 on motivation). Two concept lent from MacIntyre 
require explanation for full understanding (ibid., p.660): “External goods (external to the 
social practice) include capital, status, or power, which are the property of individuals and/or 
institutions. Internal goods are defined by the social practice and are public goods that 
benefit all participants in the social practice and the wider community.” 
 
Question 1:   
How and why do OSS developers produce high-quality software (goods) when they do? 
Theoretical Conjecture 1:   
OSS developers contribute to the production of internal goods (e.g. high-quality software) 
when their actions follow the standards of excellence of the social practice. At the same time, 
the internal good produced by the social practice impacts on standards of excellence pursued 
in the social practice. 
Proposition 1:   
Developers in a social practice create a sense of timing and developmental interactions with 
peers that improves the social practice.  
Proposition 2:   
The software product impacts on the standards of excellence in OSS development. 
 
Question 2:   
Why do OSS developers change institutions? 
Theoretical Conjecture 2:   
OSS developers change institutions when and where these institutions no longer protect 
sufficiently the standards of excellence of the social practice. In addition, institutions are 
changed in order to provide external goods that support the social practice.  
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Proposition 3:   
Institutions that offer external goods to OSS developers (such as firms participating in OSS 
and hiring developers) are judged as supportive or constraining by the developers according 
to the institutions’ adherence to the standards of excellence defined in the social practice. 
Proposition 4:  
Under certain conditions, developers of OSS are prepared to sacrifice potential rewards 
(external goods offered by a current institution) in order to make an institution compatible 
with the standards of excellence defined by the social practice of OSS. 
 
Question 3:   
Why do developers sustain the social practice of OSS development?  
Theoretical Conjecture 3:   
OSS developers sustain the social practice of OSS development because social practice instills 
the motivation to uphold its standards of excellence over time.  
Proposition 5:   
The motivation to contribute becomes stronger during developers’ tenure in an OSS 
community and by their contribution to the social practice. 
Proposition 6:   
Through sustained contributions to the social practice, developers become motivated to 
contribute beyond code patches to educate and help others, and take on tasks that support 
the internal good of the social practice. 
 
Note: In combination with the more traditional “self‐determination view”, the tenets of the 
“social practice view” have guided my evolving understanding of SugarCRM’s open source 
community (e.g. under the process of observation and evaluation of qualitative 
questionnaire results). 
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Appendix D: SugarCRM’s additional terms to the AGPLv3 
This is the legal content found in the install.php file (among other files) of Sugar CE, which 
augments the standard terms of the AGPLv3 license: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note that the herein mentioned  logo is covered by SugarCRM’s Trademark Policy, as 
discussed in chapter 4.3.3. The latest version of this policy (or “Information” thereof) can be 
found at http://www.sugarcrm.com/about/trademark‐information (at the time of writing, 
this web page states that it was last modified the 24th of February, 2012)207.  
                                                     
207 See also http://liveweb.archive.org/http://www.sugarcrm.com/about/trademark‐information  
/********************************************************************************* 
 * SugarCRM Community Edition is a customer relationship management program developed by 
 * SugarCRM, Inc. Copyright (C) 2004-2012 SugarCRM Inc. 
 *  
 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it under 
 * the terms of the GNU Affero General Public License version 3 as published by the 
 * Free Software Foundation with the addition of the following permission added 
 * to Section 15 as permitted in Section 7(a): FOR ANY PART OF THE COVERED WORK 
 * IN WHICH THE COPYRIGHT IS OWNED BY SUGARCRM, SUGARCRM DISCLAIMS THE WARRANTY 
 * OF NON INFRINGEMENT OF THIRD PARTY RIGHTS. 
 *  
 * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but WITHOUT 
 * ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS 
 * FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU Affero General Public License for more 
 * details. 
 *  
 * You should have received a copy of the GNU Affero General Public License along with 
 * this program; if not, see http://www.gnu.org/licenses or write to the Free 
 * Software Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 
 * 02110-1301 USA. 
 *  
 * You can contact SugarCRM, Inc. headquarters at 10050 North Wolfe Road, 
 * SW2-130, Cupertino, CA 95014, USA. or at email address contact@sugarcrm.com. 
 *  
 * The interactive user interfaces in modified source and object code versions 
 * of this program must display Appropriate Legal Notices, as required under 
 * Section 5 of the GNU Affero General Public License version 3. 
 *  
 * In accordance with Section 7(b) of the GNU Affero General Public License version 3, 
 * these Appropriate Legal Notices must retain the display of the "Powered by 
 * SugarCRM" logo. If the display of the logo is not reasonably feasible for 
 * technical reasons, the Appropriate Legal Notices must display the words 
 * "Powered by SugarCRM". 
 ********************************************************************************/ 
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Appendix E: SugarCRM partnership types and programs 
SugarCRM’s classifies and markets its partnership programs as such: 
Channel and Reseller Partners208: A three‐tiered channel and reseller program (Bronze, 
Silver and Gold) offers a catalog of training, marketing and sales resources. One has to fulfill 
a list of requirements to be eligible.  
Authorized Learning Partners209: “Authorized Learning Partners are chosen for their ability 
to deliver quality training. Instructors must complete certification process where they learn 
SugarCRM's education methodology and course materials.” 
OEM Partners210: “You set the price and terms for your product while Sugar helps power 
your solution. It is up to you how much [..] the customer knows about the partnership. […] 
OEM partners can modify Sugar code while retaining your own IP, rebrand Sugar as your 
own and distribute Sugar code through direct or indirect channels. [sic.]”  
Technology Partners211: “Technology partners integrate their existing applications and 
solutions into the SugarCRM platform. Technology providers from across a range of 
industries create and develop innovative solutions for SugarCRM customers and for 
promotion on SugarExchange helping drive customer adoption of the SugarCRM platform.” 
Note: Technology partners do not need to integrate a whole solution into SugarCRM – many 
of the offerings on SugarExchange are connectors to external proprietary complements.  
One can take part in several of these partnership programs in parallel. For example, Redpill 
Linpro (SugarCRM’s “most important collaborator in the Nordics”, according to itself) is both 
a Gold (reseller) partner, and Authorized Learning Partner212. It has also taken part in the 
community, and claims that it “on a number of occasions” has “delivered debugging services 
and new functions that were adopted as a part of the standard software” (ibid). 
                                                     
208 SugarCRM Channel and Reseller Partners,  
Retrieved May 28, 2012, from http://www.sugarcrm.com/partner/sugarcrm‐reseller‐levels‐and‐benefits  
209 SugarCRM Authorized Learning Program,  
Retrieved May 28, 2012, from http://www.sugarcrm.com/partner/sugarcrm‐authorized‐learning‐program    
210  Powered By SugarCRM OEM Program,  
Retrieved May 28, 2012, from http://www.sugarcrm.com/partner/powered‐sugarcrm‐oem‐program  
211 Technology Partners,  
Retrieved May 28, 2012, from http://www.sugarcrm.com/partner/technology‐partners  
212 SugarCRM, our partner, Retrieved May 28, 2012, from http://www.linpro.no/da/node/167  
 
